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Concerning Theories of Personal Identity 
 
Patrick Bailey 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a brief examination of the historical 
accounts of philosophical theories of personal identity and show the influence that each 
has had on the development of contemporary theories.  In doing so, the thesis explores 
the problems associated with these theories, attempting to establish a meta-theory (i.e. a 
theory about theories) of personal identity.  What is demonstrated is that the fundamental 
problems of personal identity arise from issues related to the use of language, as well as 
assumptions involving the concept of personhood. 
By demonstrating that our understanding of personhood is relative to frameworks 
of understanding based on assumption, the meta-theory states that propositions made 
about persons are not factual statements, but are, rather, matters of contingency.  As such, 
propositions about persons contain truth-value only within a particular frame of reference 
that is based on these assumptions.  Therefore, the problems that traditionally arise in 
theories of personal identity – problems with dualism, the mental criterion, and bodily 
criterion – result from a flawed approach to the problem altogether.  The conclusion is 
that it is possible to construct a theory of personal identity (a relative theory), but not the 
theory of personal identity (one which is definitive and strictly conclusive). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Examining the philosophical problem of personal identity requires considering 
several inter-related concepts, all of which help answer questions pertaining to different 
aspects about this problem.  What is the problem of personal identity?  It is a problem 
that arises when considering what it is to be the same person from moment to moment.  
That is, what makes us inclined to say that we are the same person now as we were five 
years ago, as well as that we will be the same person five years from today?  At the level 
of experience, nothing could be more obvious than the fact that we are the same persons 
now as we are at any other given point in our lives.  Yet, what does it mean to be the 
same person?  To attempt to answer this question, we must consider concepts such as 
identity and sameness, personhood, mind and the self, bodily continuity, and memory and 
psychological continuity. 
To begin, identity is the relationship that a thing bears to itself, as compared to its 
relationship to other objects.  In other words, identity is what makes a thing what it is, 
which separates it and makes it distinguishable from all other things.  Our understanding 
of identity is what gives rise to our concept of sameness.  For example, if we claim that X 
and Y are the same, then what we are asserting is that both X and Y are, in fact, identical.   
 Personhood is the concept of what it means to be classified or qualified as a 
person.  Personhood, then, is the sum total of all criteria that a thing must possess to be a 
person.  Typically, these criteria are cited as being properties such as consciousness and, 
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more specifically, self-consciousness, as well as freedom of will, being a moral agent, 
and the ability to use language, among others.  Some of these criteria imply certain 
perplexities that are contrary to our phenomenal experiences about personal identity.  For 
example, at a phenomenal level (i.e. the level of experience), it seems counterintuitive to 
suggest that there was a time when we were not persons.  Yet, claiming that moral agency 
and the ability to use language are two of the criteria of personhood implies that some 
human beings do not qualify as persons.  One such example is babies.  Babies lack both 
the ability to act morally and the ability to use language.  The implication, then, is that 
persons are not things we simply are; rather, what is implied is that persons are things we 
become as we acquire the appropriate characteristics of personhood.  Yet another 
implication is that, if we were to lose these criteria, we would lose our status of 
personhood.  We see, then, that there are many perplexities that arise when we consider 
the concepts of personal identity, which are not apparent at the simple level of 
experience.  The examination throughout this thesis will focus on the problems that are 
involved in attempting to develop a definitive theory of personal identity.  By a definitive 
theory, I mean one that is conclusive – one that resolves the issues concerning the 
concept of personal identity.  From our understanding of the concepts of identity and 
personhood, we see that we are essentially asking three fundamental questions, when 
inquiring about personal identity: 1) what is identity?; 2) what is a person?; and 3) what 
makes a person the same from one moment to another? 
 Another aspect of addressing the problem of personal identity involves examining 
ideas regarding our first-person perspective.  That is, not only do we address issues about 
personal identity as it applies to others, but we also address personal identity as it relates 
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to ourselves.  The first-person perspective poses problems that are not necessarily present 
when we examine the identity of others.  For example, if we consider the identity of other 
persons, we may not believe it necessary to think that questions about their identities 
must have determinate answers.  We may feel inclined to say that there are instances 
when we could not determine whether or not someone was the same person from one 
instance to another.  Yet, when we consider our own identity this assertion appears to be 
an absurdity.  It seems we should always be able to give a definitive answer to the 
question, “Am I the same person as I was or will be at any other given moment?”  
Furthermore, how do we know, in the strict sense, that we are the same from moment to 
moment? 
 In turning questions about personal identity towards ourselves, we then begin to 
examine concepts such as mind and the self.  These concepts, often conflated, refer to a 
kind of internalized representation of who or what we are.  This internalized 
representation comes from the realization that we are individuals, separated not only from 
all other people, but also separated in a unique way from the entire universe – there is no 
other thing that exists that is identical to our individual being.  While sometimes used 
interchangeably, there are subtle differences that arise in our use of the concepts of mind 
and self.  For instance, there are times when we describe mind as being thought or the 
process of thought and brain functioning, whereas self is often described as something 
entirely different.  Self, in such instances, appears to take on the description of a kind of 
psychological core or center, in that it is described as being the essence of what we are.  
The concept of this sort of psychological centrality or unification comes from our 
representations of ourselves at the phenomenal level.  There is a sense of being in our 
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head, so to speak, which gives us not only the feeling of being separated from all other 
things, but also gives rise to the belief that we are something more than the collective 
parts of our bodies. 
 When we consider the idea of losing various parts of our body, we realize that 
such a loss does not affect what we say regarding our personal identity.  The loss of our 
limbs and replacements of internal organs do not, we say, make us different persons than 
we were before these changes occur.  Yet, there is also a sense in which our bodies do 
play a part in answering questions about our personal identity.  For example, some of the 
criteria we regard when answering questions about personal identity are bodily identity, 
and mental criteria, such as memory and psychological continuity.  Bodily identity allows 
us to determine whether or not a body at one time is the same body at another time, 
because we can trace a body’s spatio-temporal continuity from one moment to the next in 
a series of causally connected moments. 
 We understand memory as the ability to recall events about our past.  Memory is 
an important concept regarding the investigation of personal identity, because it is our 
recollection that helps establish our sense of being continuant individuals.  That is to say, 
memory allows us to recall whether or not we are the same person that did X at a 
previous time.  Our ability to recall our past actions connects us to those actions as the 
person who performed them.  They are actions that are uniquely ours.  No other person, 
we believe, can share in our self-history in the way that it relates to our own first-person 
perspective.  Yet, it is obvious that our memory is fallible.  It is in instances where 
memory claims become dubious that we often consider the other criteria, such as bodily 
identity or psychological continuity, to support our theories of personal identity. 
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 Psychological continuity goes beyond the scope of memory in that it includes 
other sorts of mental phenomena and psychological states, such as a person’s beliefs, 
intentions, desires, and character.  By including these phenomena, in addition to memory, 
a theory of personal identity can be posited even if the memory criterion proves to be 
invalidated.  We see, then, that psychological continuity (not unlike bodily identity) is a 
concept that involves a causal relationship – an overlapping of various psychological 
states that connect a person’s mental history into a series of such states, which spans from 
one time to another.  These psychological states and various mental phenomena are also 
posited as unique to each individual person. 
 It is with an understanding of the above concepts that we will examine the 
problem of personal identity.  Our examination will investigate historical and 
contemporary theories and will demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of each.  The 
result will be to explain why these theories of personal identity have failed to provide the 
sort of conclusive, definitive theory that we hope to establish. 
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
 
Historical Significance 
In this opening chapter, it is my intent to introduce three of the primary historical 
accounts of the problem of personal identity.  The historical accounts we will examine 
are those presented by Rene Descartes, John Locke, and David Hume.  The purpose of 
including these historical accounts is to demonstrate the influence each has had on our 
contemporary discussions about personal identity.  As such, it is not my intent here to 
present a painstakingly scholastic examination of each philosopher’s position.  Instead, I 
present a less specialized (i.e. general or introductory) approach, merely because I want 
the focus of this thesis to rest on the contemporary discussions.  While important in their 
own right, these historical accounts are used herein as a tool for laying the foundations of 
the contemporary views examined in the chapters ahead. 
The Cartesian Mind-Body Problem 
 In investigating the nature of the human mind, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) 
creates what is called the mind-body problem.  In short, Descartes’ position affirms that 
there is a fundamental difference between mind and body.  The mind-body problem, as 
we shall see, derives from the belief that mind is a substance that is not extended in 
space, unlike body.  Describing mind as a non-extended (immaterial) substance raises the 
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question of whether mental phenomena are equal to physical phenomena or, if not, how 
mental and physical phenomena relate to each other.  The mind-body problem, then, is an 
attempt to reconcile conflicts in the concepts of the interactions of mental phenomena and 
physical brain processes.  While it is often the case that we examine the mind-body 
problem separately from that of personal identity, I believe the two are not mutually 
exclusive of each other.  Sydney Shoemaker echoes this idea when he states, “The 
problem of personal identity can be viewed as an aspect of the mind-body problem.”1  We 
might say that Descartes was, in a sense, exploring personal identity inadvertently when 
he examined the mind-body problem.  Reasons supporting this idea will become apparent 
as we proceed with our investigation. 
Descartes’ query into the nature of the human mind begins when he asks himself 
what he can know with certainty – those beliefs he might have which are beyond all 
doubt.  He proposes to set aside anything, “which admits of the slightest doubt,”2 in order 
to find what can be known with unyielding certainty.  What this means is that Descartes 
will hold as false any belief he has where doubt can be raised regarding its truth-value.  In 
doing so, he aims to uncover propositions of certainty or come to the realization that there 
is no certainty.  From this beginning, Descartes determines that the one thing he cannot 
doubt is his own existence, because if he can put forth a thought regarding his existence, 
then he necessarily exists (16).  The one thing inseparable from him, he believed, was 
thought (Descartes, 18).  It is with this foundation that Descartes begins to address 
notions pivotal for the concept of personal identity. 
In his attempt to discover the nature of his existence and, furthermore, what can 
be known (in the strict sense), Descartes examines the concept of ‘I’.  His realization that 
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he cannot remove himself from thought brought him to describe ‘I’ as a thinking thing, 
which is, essentially, “a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason…” (Descartes, 18) 
and also a “thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and 
also imagines and has sensory perceptions.” (Descartes, 19).    It is easy to see why I (like 
Shoemaker) believe the mind-body problem is an aspect of the problem of personal 
identity.  “What am I?” and “Am I the same, today, as I was ten years ago?” are ways that 
questions about personal identity are often phrased. 
Descartes’ mind-body problem results from the assertion that his mind is not 
identical with his body.  That is, he states that self-movement is foreign to the nature of 
bodies (Descartes, 17) and claims that, “I am not that structure of limbs which is called a 
human body.” (Descartes, 18).  This basic assertion about the nature of minds and bodies 
provides the foundation he needs for a mind-body distinction and it is precisely this sort 
of assertion that some people, such as John Searle, think allows the mind-body problem 
to persist as it does in our contemporary philosophical discussions.  In fact, Searle states, 
“I am convinced that part of the difficulty is that we persist in talking about a twentieth-
century problem in an outmoded seventeenth-century vocabulary.”3 
Clearly, we can understand the importance of Searle’s assertion by comparing a 
Cartesian description to one from contemporary sources.  For example, in the 
Meditations, Descartes describes ‘body’ as, “whatever has a determinable shape and a 
definable location and can occupy a space in such a way as to exclude any other body.” 
(17).  In contrast, Paul Churchland states: 
It is now neither useful nor accurate to characterize ordinary matter as 
that-which-has-extension-in-space.  Electrons, for example, are bits of 
matter, but our best current theories describe the electrons as a point-
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particle with no extension whatever (it even lacks a determinate spatial 
position).4 
 
Noting this distinction between previous and present descriptions is important 
because it is Descartes’ understanding of bodies that is essential for his belief of mind-
body separation.  Once we blur or erase the Cartesian line between mind and body, those 
like Searle believe we can finally put the issue to rest.  Part of the problem with the 
Cartesian position is the need to explain why mere matter cannot produce a phenomenon 
such as thought.  I believe that the idea that there must be something extra required for 
intelligence, thought, intention, consciousness, and the like, comes from our observations 
of inanimate and animate objects.  We observe various objects, both natural and artificial, 
some of which display intelligence and consciousness, while others do not.  For example, 
human beings behave with intelligence and consciousness – behavior not observed in 
things such as liquids, gases, solids and all things typically categorized as inanimate.  
Therefore, presumably, from the Cartesian position, there must be some fundamental 
difference between animate and inanimate objects.  For Descartes the immaterial 
substance of mind is what accounts for this difference, which is not possessed by those 
things we observe to be inanimate.  However, nowadays, computers (especially as they 
relate to artificial intelligence) are a peculiar kind of example, in that they are man-made 
objects that can perhaps be described as acting intelligently.  We will consider the 
implications of intelligently behaving machines in the chapters ahead. 
Searle asserts that the mind-problem has less to do with immaterial substances 
than it does with a need for a better understanding of causation (20).  Searle argues that 
there are essentially four things that have caused us to say such “strange and implausible 
things” about the mind: 1) consciousness, 2) intentionality, 3) subjectivity, and 4) mental 
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causation (15-17).  We can appreciate Searle’s perspective a bit more by understanding 
that he believes the mind is nothing more (or less) than a result of the simple biological 
functioning of the brain.  Hence, he asks, “Why do we still have in philosophy and 
psychology after all these centuries a ‘mind-body problem’ in a way that we do not have, 
say, a ‘digestion-stomach’ problem?” (Searle, 14).  For Searle the mind and the brain are 
separate only in our descriptions, not in the substantial sense of the Cartesian position. 
Descartes’ sense of ‘I’ is not one that is identical to mental states.  In other words, 
this ‘I’ is a thing that has mental states and, curiously enough, exists apart from the body.  
He states, “…it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without 
it.” (Descartes, 54).  We understand, then, that his position champions mind as the 
necessary substance of one’s existence.  Bodies, he believes, in contrast, are not essential 
to the existence of thinking things – allowing that we could all very well go on existing 
should our bodies vaporize at any given moment. 
All of these ideas raise questions regarding personal identity.  For example, if we 
grant the separation of mind and body, then which of these, if either, account for personal 
identity?  The Cartesian account, resting on the mind-body distinction, allows us to 
formulate the following as our options for a theory of personal identity: Are persons 
identical with minds, with bodies, or with the union of the two?  Or does personal identity 
consist of something else entirely?  Descartes never directly answers this question.  That 
is, he leaves no doubt as to what he believes is the essential nature of his being (mind, as 
opposed to body), yet at no time does he explicitly state that he equates minds and 
persons. 
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What we do get from Descartes, however, is that minds are neither identical to 
mental states, themselves, nor to bodies.  Accordingly, if we argue that persons are 
identical to Cartesian minds, then persons are not identical to mental states or bodies.  As 
we have seen, Descartes defines a mind as a thinking thing that has mental states and is 
separate from his body.  It appears, I think, that there are contradictions in Descartes’ 
argument.  For example, thus far we have seen that he argues he is essentially a mind, and 
that this mind is not simply identical to thought, but is, rather a thing that has thoughts – a 
thing that thinks.  Yet, he also claims, “For it could be that were I totally to cease from 
thinking, I should totally cease to exist.” (Descartes, 18).  The contradiction becomes 
clear through the following questioning: If minds are thinking things, which are not equal 
to thought but things that have thoughts, then how could the cessation of thought cause a 
mind to cease its existence?  That is, only if minds are identical with thought should 
Descartes’ assertion logically follow.  If minds are things that have thoughts, then a mind 
should still exist even when all thinking ceases, because the thing that thinks should 
remain even when thinking (the action performed by this thinking thing) has stopped. 
What then is a person – an immaterial substance?  Let us consider each of the 
above questions, briefly, to understand their implications.  Greater detail will be given 
when we look at the mental criterion and the bodily criterion. 
Are persons identical with minds?  By equating persons with Cartesian minds, we 
are then claiming that persons are immaterial substances, which are thinking things that 
do not rely on a body for their existence.  Therefore, wherever this mind goes, so goes the 
person.  Speaking in this way, we can say that persons have bodies.  It may be argued that 
minds are not extended and, as such, minds do not go anywhere, because they are not in 
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space.  Yet, if minds are not in space, then in what way do they exist separately from the 
body?  How do they exist when not embodied?  This does not entail that, since minds 
cannot be observed in any way apart from bodies, therefore minds do not exist apart from 
bodies.  Clearly, they can exist apart from bodies without our being able to observe them 
directly, but how would we determine the truth or falsity of such a claim?  Claiming to 
know that minds can exist apart from bodies, without any directly observable phenomena, 
is essentially like stating, “I cannot see, hear, or touch a mind when it exists separately 
from a body, yet I am certain that it exists in such a way.”  I think an appropriate 
response to this assertion is, “OK, so, how do you know?”  The problem is not only that 
we cannot verify the claim through direct observation – we cannot even describe a 
conceivable way to verify the truth of our assertion.  Again, the need for verification here 
does not in any way alter the truth or falsity of the proposition.  Rather, what it changes is 
our right to claim we have genuine knowledge about the truth or falsity of our 
proposition. 
Similarly, how can we determine if an immaterial substance is the same from one 
moment to the next?  That is, if we cannot in any way examine the immaterial substance 
claimed to inhabit a body, then how can we verify whether or not the immaterial 
substance inhabiting Michael Ellis’ body is, in fact, that same immaterial substance that 
inhabited his body two years ago?  When discussing the bodily criterion, we will 
understand why it is difficult to defend a theory of personal identity based on the premise 
of immaterial substances. 
Are persons identical with bodies?  If we maintain the logic of the Cartesian 
position, then we agree that minds and bodies are separate; therefore, minds and persons 
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are separate (if persons are bodies); therefore, minds are not persons.  This approach 
eliminates the problem of verifying claims about immaterial substances, since it asserts 
that persons simply are bodies.  However, we will see that similarly difficult 
consequences arise for a theory of personal identity founded on the premise of the bodily 
criterion, when we consider several problem cases. 
Are persons a result of the union of minds and bodies?  This question may seem a 
bit peculiar, since it is not often considered, so I will restate it in another manner.  Do 
persons exist only when we have the union of both mind and body, in the Cartesian 
sense?  Here is what this description implies: minds, apart from bodies, are not persons.  
Furthermore, bodies, apart from minds, are not persons.  Only when we have a union of a 
particular mind with a particular body can we have personal identity, by this account. 
The problem with the above position is that neither minds nor bodies, themselves, 
constitute persons.  This implies that a person is a unified mind and body, but is not 
identical with a mind or a body.  Therefore, it further implies that having both a mind and 
a body is a necessary condition of being a person.  Wherever the mind and the body goes, 
then, so goes the person.  Like the claim that persons are minds, this position faces the 
same problems regarding the verification of immaterial substances.  That is, if we claim 
persons are a result of the union of minds and bodies, then how do we verify the 
existence of the immaterial substance (mind), which accounts for part of this unification?  
So far as we can tell, all that exists is the material body, which does not allow for 
persons, according to this position.  The result is that we could never tell whether or not a 
genuine person exists, since we cannot verify the existence of fifty percent of this union – 
namely, the immaterial mind. 
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Perhaps the objection will be raised that verification of our claims about 
immaterial substances is not necessary in order for these claims to be meaningful.  I will 
agree with this claim to the extent that beliefs are in fact meaningful, to some degree, 
without needing verification.  However, what I argue is that propositions made without 
any sort of demonstrable verification (whether it be direct observation or premises that 
follow from self-evident truths) bear no legitimate claim to genuine knowledge.  To 
suggest otherwise dissolves the distinction between knowledge, in the strict sense, and 
belief. 
Returning to the concept of causation, we find other accounts that compound the 
difficulties of the Cartesian mind-body distinction.  How does something entirely 
immaterial (mind) interact with and influence something entirely material (body)?  
Answering this question is important for our understanding of personal identity, because 
the answer we get will help shape the contemporary arguments for and against the mind-
body problem.  The root of this problem, from the Cartesian account, is explaining 
causation between two fundamentally different substances.  Descartes was well aware of 
this problem and made attempts to reconcile it, since clarifying this point is pivotal to the 
strength of the Cartesian position.  That is, in order to solidify the logical foundations of 
his argument, Descartes must account for the mind’s ability to interact with or upon a 
body.  He elaborates upon his previous descriptions about mind and body, stating, “…I 
am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but I am very closely 
joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit.” 
(Descartes, 56). 
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It is counterintuitive, I think, to describe minds as being both separate from and, 
at the same time, closely joined with the body.  This is why those such as Searle believe it 
is so important to rethink the way we conceive the mind-body problem.  In Searle’s case, 
if minds and bodies do not separately exist, then we do not face the problems of causal 
interaction present in the Cartesian position.  This might lead us to the hasty assumption 
that personal identity consists solely in the physical or bodily criterion.  Yet, the problem 
cases ahead will demonstrate why we must also carefully consider this conclusion. 
As we saw, the Cartesian mind-body distinction allows us to formulate four 
possible accounts of personal identity: 1) personal identity goes where the mind goes; 2) 
personal identity goes where the body goes; 3) personal identity is a result of the union of 
both mind and body; 4) personal identity is a result of something entirely apart from the 
mind and the body.  To this we can add a fifth account – that there is no such thing as 
personal identity.  These accounts, in many ways, form the summation of the various 
theories of personal identity we find in contemporary discussions.  We might argue that 
these accounts, as described here, are counterintuitive, because identity does not move, as 
it were.  Yet, we will see in the following chapter that the mental criterion and 
psychological criterion both suggest that personal identity follows the brain. 
The first of the above accounts regards the content associated with the memory 
and psychological criteria.  The second and third accounts address the bodily criterion 
and the notion that mind and body are essential to personal identity, respectively.  The 
fourth account affirms that what matters is something such as survival, rather than 
identity, which we will discuss later.  Finally, the fifth account addresses the idea that 
either there really are no criteria we use when we talk about personal identity, or that 
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personal identity is an illusion of sorts.  Before addressing these issues in a contemporary 
forum, we will discuss how the ideas of both Locke and Hume influenced the way we 
think about personal identity. 
The concept of sameness is a concept closely related to the concept of personal 
identity, as well as our understanding of identity in general. This is obvious in such 
questions as, “Will I be the same person if I suffer from amnesia?”  In fact, without the 
idea of sameness we would not have the notion of identity.  It is sameness that allows us 
to recognize an object at time T1 as the object we see also at time T2.  This applies to 
Descartes’ argument in that he claims he is not only a thinking thing, but is also the same 
thinking thing from one moment to the next (19).  Yet, this idea merely begs the question, 
“How or what is it that is the same from one moment to the next?”  It is not enough for us 
simply to state we are the same persons (or minds, for Descartes).  To establish a viable 
theory about personal identity we must also demonstrate how or why we are the same 
persons. 
It is arguable that we could claim, from the Cartesian perspective, that being the 
same mind from moment to moment demonstrates the separation of mind and body.  That 
is, if we lose any number of limbs (or other body parts), we would not be inclined to 
claim that we were different persons.  The Cartesian could argue, then, that the mind is 
genuinely separate from the body and, therefore, no amount of bodily loss will change 
our identity.  For Descartes, what follows from this is the demonstration that 1) minds are 
“single and complete,” and 2) the mind is entirely different from the body (59).  In 
Chapter 3, we will see how our understanding of the brain weakens the impact of such 
claims. 
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Another claim Descartes makes about mind-body causality is that the only part of 
the body that immediately affects the mind is the brain – specifically, the pineal gland.5  
This claim is important because it demonstrates upward and downward causality in 
Descartes’ argument, for not only do we have the mind causally affecting the body, but 
we also have the brain affecting the mind in a causal relation.  The idea of two-way 
causality is a notion that Searle champions, which he believes helps dispel the mind-body 
problem.  Searle states, “Nothing is more common in nature than for surface features of a 
phenomenon to be both caused by and realized in a micro-structure, and those are exactly 
the relationships that are exhibited by the relation of mind and brain.”(Searle, 22).  Again, 
the idea here is that understanding the process is what is important in order to dispel the 
mystery. 
What Searle’s statement brings to the discussion of mind-body causality is that we 
do not need to appeal to immaterial substances for our explanations.  Accordingly, our 
theory of personal identity will be based on our understanding of the micro-level 
functions of the brain and their relationship to the behavior of the higher-level features of 
the system.  This kind of explanation is very similar to the notion of the emergent 
properties of systems, in that the brain, by virtue of its organization and simple functions, 
produces such phenomena as consciousness, intentionality, thought and the like.  We can 
clearly see the rejection of immaterial substances and their role in causal relations, when 
Searle asks, “How, for example, could anything as ‘weightless’ and ‘ethereal’ as a 
thought give rise to an action?”(25).  He follows with, “The answer is that thoughts are 
not weightless and ethereal.  When you have a thought, brain activity is actually going 
on.” (Searle, 25). 
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Clearly, the evidence demonstrates that the Cartesian mind-body problem 
generates many difficulties for our formulation of a definitive theory of personal identity.  
Its focus on defining the self in terms of immaterial substances creates problems on both 
the causal level, as well as the level of experiential verification.  The philosophical 
position of Locke shifts away from the concept of substance, focusing instead on the role 
of memory in defining one’s personal identity.  While the memory criterion eludes the 
problems associated with immaterial substances, it creates other issues, which are 
similarly potent to the formulation of a definitive theory of personal identity. 
Locke and Consciousness 
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke (1632-1704) 
develops what has become one of the most influential contributions to the discussion of 
personal identity – the idea that consciousness (i.e., memory) is vital to the constitution of 
our identity through time.  Although there are some similarities between Locke’s 
treatment of persons and the ideas discussed regarding Cartesian selves, Locke’s 
argument is fundamentally different than Descartes’ mind-body problem.  This 
fundamental difference, as we will see, is a result of the way these two philosophers view 
the role of substance, with regard to its importance in determining issues associated with 
personal identity. 
In short, what Locke argues is that memory accounts for personal identity and that 
the sorts of substances described in the mind-body problem do not determine our identity 
over time.  Most of the criticisms against Locke’s position can be generalized into four 
primary claims: 1) Locke conflates the concepts of consciousness and memory; 2) his 
theory, taken literally, requires criteria too stringent to produce a viable definition of 
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personal identity; 3) memory cannot define personal identity, since it presupposes it; 4) 
memory cannot define personal identity, because memory claims are essentially 
unverifiable.  These criticisms are introduced here, but will be examined more fully in the 
following chapter, when we examine the contemporary discussions of the memory 
criterion and the psychological criterion. 
To begin, what can we find from comparing Locke’s argument with the ideas 
expressed by Descartes?  One of the first similarities we find between Locke and 
Descartes is the idea that altering the mass of a living body does not alter its identity.  As 
we saw, Descartes argued that losing a limb or other body part does not affect the 
sameness of his mind.  Similarly, Locke states that, “In the state of living Creatures, their 
Identity depends not on a Mass of the same Particles; but on something else.  For in them 
the variation of great parcels of Matter alters not the Identity…”6 and, furthermore, “The 
reason whereof is, that in these two cases of a Mass of Matter, and a living Body, Identity 
is not applied to the same thing.” (330). 
We see, then, that Locke believes the identity of living things is different from 
that of non-living things.  For a living being, he argues, identity is communicated through 
the common life, or continuity of life, of that being (Locke, 331).  This is why we can 
claim that a tree is the same tree, from year to year, even though branches and leaves may 
fall from it.  Though its mass changes, it holds the same continuity of life.  So long as the 
continuity of life remains intact, accordingly, we find the preservation of identity in 
living things.  This notion produces some assumptions or implications about the 
differences of animate and inanimate objects – namely, it implies that living bodies 
(animate objects) are other than mere matter (inanimate objects).  The implication we 
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find here is the same kind of belief in something extra we observed in Descartes’ 
philosophy. 
Locke creates a further distinction between being the same man and being the 
same person.  The same man, he writes, consists in “a participation of the same continued 
Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same 
organized Body.” (331).  Locke’s man is identical with a biological body.  By way of 
comparison, he describes a person as “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and 
reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and 
places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and 
as it seems to me essential to it….” (Locke, 335).  He follows by claiming that the 
identity of persons extends backward and forward, into our past and future, only so far as 
this consciousness extends – thereby uniting our identity with our actions and thoughts 
(Locke, 336). 
Why does Locke make this distinction between man and person?  I believe he 
does so for the same reasons we find the mind-body distinction in Descartes’ argument – 
namely, because Locke needs a way to account for the immaterial aspects of humans.  
Since the distinction Locke makes is that a man is a material body, while a person is a 
thinking, intelligent being, it is obvious that this implied something extra is a quality 
belonging to persons, rather than bodies.  Persons, then, refers to the vitality or animate 
aspect of humans, whereas a man is the inanimate body of matter.  We should not 
assume, therefore, that Locke is equating person with immaterial substance.  Clearly, 
Locke does not equate persons with immaterial substances, in the Cartesian sense.  That 
is not what I am implying when I refer to the immaterial aspect of animate objects.  
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Rather, what I mean is that we find the same sort of tacit belief implied in Locke’s 
writing as we do in Descartes – that mere matter cannot produce the phenomena of 
consciousness, intentionality, thought, and the like.  However, in addressing this notion, 
Locke denies that immaterial substances, as well as body, play no role in determining 
one’s personal identity.  Hence, he states: 
That if the same consciousness (which, as has been shewn, is quite a 
different thing from the same numerical Figure or Motion in Body) can be 
transferr’d from one thinking Substance to another, it will be possible, that 
two thinking Substances may make but one Person.  For the same 
consciousness being preserv’d whether in the same or different 
Substances, the personal identity is preserv’d. (Locke, 338). 
 
Locke’s concept of person differs from a Cartesian self, in that a Cartesian self is 
an immaterial substance.  In contrast, Locke’s person is something that may reside in or 
be expressed through an immaterial substance, yet is independent of it.  The sort of 
substance involved, – material or immaterial – says Locke, is irrelevant for both the 
determination and preservation of personal identity (336).  So, we see that Locke’s 
person is immaterial in the sense that it is not bound by substance, but exists so long as 
the same consciousness exists.  This is precisely the point made by David Wiggins, 
regarding substance, when he states, “A person is material in the sense of being 
essentially enmattered; but in the strict and different sense…person is not necessarily a 
material concept.”7 A consequence of this disregard for substance, with regard to the 
preservation of personal identity, as stated in Locke’s quote, above, is that persons are 
things that can occupy more than one body.  For we note that Locke argues that two 
thinking substances may make a single person, so long as the same consciousness is 
preserved.  When we examine some of the issues about persons and duplication, in 
Chapter 2, we will see why Locke’s assertion here strains the concept of personal identity 
 22 
– primarily, because of the problem of identity with regard to the diverging futures of 
objects (i.e., fission). 
It is Locke’s idea of the primacy of consciousness, with regard to personal 
identity, that generates most of the criticisms about his theory.  As noted earlier, one of 
these criticisms is that Locke appears to confound the notions of consciousness and 
memory.  This is a problem cited both in modern discussions, as well as in the writings of 
Locke’s contemporaries.8  Generally, it is assumed that Locke is, in fact, discussing 
memory when he writes about consciousness, since there is clearly a difference between 
the two concepts.  That is to say, I can be conscious of a great many things, all of which 
do not require the slightest use of my memory.  For instance, I am immediately aware of 
objects that I perceive through my senses.  When I am immediately aware of an object, I 
perceive the object in that particular moment – it is not a matter of recalling a past idea of 
it.  Memory, on the other hand, is referential to the past, which entails recollection.  
Although I can be conscious of my memories, I need not be remembering in order to be 
conscious of something. 
The sense that we get from Locke’s use of consciousness is very much akin to our 
use of memory.  As we have just observed, Locke remarks about consciousness extending 
into our past, uniting us with past actions and thoughts.  This is precisely the notion we 
have when we speak about memory.  If I make the claim, “I remember eating chocolate 
cake at my fifth-year birthday party,” then what my statement asserts is that I have a 
memory of that particular event.  Although I could say, “I am conscious of eating 
chocolate cake at my fifth-year birthday party,” this seems a bit peculiarly stated, 
regarding a recollection.  This is because consciousness, unlike memory, need not imply 
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recollection.  We can easily demonstrate this notion by assuming that I made the 
statement at my fifth-year birthday party.  By adding this fact, it is clear that my 
statement then becomes one regarding events of which I am immediately aware, since I 
am making the statement while eating the cake, as opposed to remembering the cake at 
some future time. 
This criticism against Locke is fair, I think, although it has no real impact on the 
overall validity of his argument.  There is no validity lost in the logic of his argument by 
conflating these terms, since the concept associated with the terms is what matters.  
Simply put, if Locke’s use of consciousness carries the same logical tone (i.e. meaning) 
as our use of memory, then the two are really expressing the same idea.  I think this is the 
general consensus view of Locke, since we find that all of the modern literature makes 
reference to his work in terms of memory, even though Locke specifically refers to 
consciousness.  As such, I believe this is the least damaging of the criticisms against 
Locke’s position, since the other three criticisms we cited earlier do take measures to 
weaken the foundations of logic in his argument. 
Another common criticism raised against Locke’s use of memory is that, taken 
literally, it demands too much.  For instance, he states, “And as far back as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches 
the Identity of that Person….” (Locke, 335).  A literal reading of this statement requires 
that our minds remember everything that has ever happened to us, in order to remain the 
same person.  John Perry recognizes this problem and states that, if read literally, Locke’s 
theory “…requires us to be able to remember everything that ever happened to us…. On 
the face of it, Locke has given us too stringent a necessary condition for an earlier 
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experience to belong to a person.”9  Obviously, no one can remember everything that has 
ever happened during his/her existence, and therein is the problem with a literal 
interpretation of Locke’s theory. 
Predecessors of Perry’s position include Joseph Butler (1692 – 1752) and Thomas 
Reid (1710 – 1796).  Both agree that it is not necessary for one to remember a thought or 
an act, in order to qualify as the one who had the thought or made the action.  For 
instance, Reid states, “That relation to me which is expressed by saying that I did it, 
would be the same though I had not the least remembrance of it.”10  What is important, by 
Reid’s measure, is not the ability to recall, but that there is a genuine relation between the 
person and the thought or act in question.  This relation, accordingly, exists 
independently of one’s memory and is of greater consideration when questioning the 
identity of persons.  Butler agrees by confirming the idea that present consciousness of 
past actions is not necessary to our being the person involved in the events.11 
A further consequence of reading Locke literally, as Reid observed, is that 
Locke’s description of memory and personal identity breaks down the transitivity of 
one’s identity.  That is, taken literally, Locke is dedicated to the position that if a person 
cannot remember a past act or thought, then that person is not the same person who 
executed the actions or thoughts in question.  Reid demonstrates that Locke’s description 
makes it possible that, “a man may be, and at the same time not be, the person that did a 
particular action.”12   In his example, Reid shows that a middle-aged man could remember 
an event from his childhood that he could not remember as an elderly man; yet the elderly 
man could remember events from when he was middle-aged, so that his consciousness 
remains uninterrupted throughout his whole life.  The middle-aged man is the person who 
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is connected to both the child and the elderly man, even though the child is not connected 
to the elderly man.  The result, says Reid, is that the middle-aged man is the same person 
as both the child and the elderly man; yet the elderly man is not the same person as the 
child. 
Both Reid (214) and Butler (388) object to the idea that, as Locke’s argument 
states, personal identity is defined by memory.  They argue that Locke’s claim is 
impossible, since memory presupposes personal identity.  What this means is that for 
there to be a memory, there must first be a person that, in a sense, owns that memory.  
This kind of objection claims Locke is guilty of reversing the order of causation.  The 
result, Reid states, is that memory is granted “a strange magical power of producing its 
object, though that object must have existed before the memory or consciousness which 
produced it.” (214).  This objection appears sound on the surface.  Yet, if we restate the 
objection as a question, we see that the idea may not be quite so straightforward.  For 
example, let us say we ask, “Is every memory produced by a person that, in some sense, 
owns that memory?”  If our answer affirms this question, then some problem cases arise.  
For now we may ask, “What about such cases as animals or, perhaps, computers – do 
these objects qualify as persons, since they are capable of recollection?” 
The notion expressed here is that if memory presupposes personal identity, then 
wherever we find memory we should, by necessity, find persons.  Clearly, Reid and 
Butler are correct in that it is not possible for an effect to precede its cause (assuming a 
linearly unfolding timeline).  What is in question, rather, is whether or not every object 
that produces memory is a person, since the claim is that memory presupposes personal 
identity.  I only want to draw our attention to this problem here.  These questions will be 
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examined at length, in Chapter 4, when we discuss how description affects our theories of 
personal identity. 
The last charge against Locke’s position we will consider is the argument that the 
memory criterion cannot define personal identity, because our memories are ultimately 
beyond verification.  This argument is based on two assumptions: 1) memory is fallible to 
the point that we can have false memories, and 2) verification of memory claims requires 
some sort of qualification beyond our introspection.  Again, Chapter 2 will deal with 
these ideas at length, but we will introduce ourselves to these criticisms, and some of 
their counterparts, here. 
The first notion, of false memories, is certainly a problem for determining 
personal identity using the memory criterion.  If false memories occur, which we 
perceive as events genuinely belonging to our past, then we are incorporating fictions into 
our concept of who we are.  The fact that we make a distinction between genuine and 
false memories implies that we have a method for determining the differences between 
the two.  To resolve the issue of false memories there must be some form of alternate 
verification we can use to determine the truth of a memory claim.  Yet, the very fact that 
an alternative form of verification to introspection is needed demonstrates (or at the very 
least, implies) that memory itself is not enough to determine personal identity; rather, 
memory and some other phenomena may work. 
If all memory claims were necessarily true, then we eliminate the need for 
alternative verification, since introspection alone would suffice.  Yet, it is easy enough to 
demonstrate situations when claims we affirm are simply false memories, and it is in 
these situations that the need for verification arises.  Seeming to remember an event is 
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slightly different, in that there are various ways in which I may be incorrect about the 
claim I assert.  If I claim to remember helping lay the last stone atop the Great Pyramid at 
Giza, during its original construction, then clearly I am either lying or experiencing a 
false memory.  However, on the other hand, if I claim that I seem to remember eating 
chocolate cake at my fifth-year birthday party, then I may genuinely have a vague 
recollection of the event, I could only be recalling the recounting of the event by others, 
or I could again be having a false memory, if in fact I never ate chocolate cake at this 
event. 
What all of these examples demonstrate is that my introspection will not 
necessarily guide me to the truth of the matter.  External verification, by the testimony of 
others, written documents, or some other source, is necessary to help support the validity 
of the memory claims I make.  Yet, arguably, the external verification only brings us to 
the original objection – that memory claims are ultimately beyond verification.  That is, 
we could argue that, even though we have external verification supporting a memory 
claim, the evidence we provide is itself in need of further verification.  Thus, the 
objection is that no amount of evidence is going to produce unyielding certainty.  This 
objection, however, has less to do with a deficiency of the memory criterion than it does 
the criteria we place on verifiability, as we will see in the details discussed in Chapter 2. 
One of the results of the failure of Descartes and Locke to secure a definitive 
theory of personal identity is Hume’s denial of the self.  The lack of evidence for the 
existence of immaterial substances, coupled with the problems of the memory criterion, 
was enough to convince Hume that personal identity was, for the most part, created in the 
imagination by appearing to unite our sense-perceptions into a continuant self. 
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Hume’s Denial and the Bundle Theory 
 From its very beginning, David Hume’s (1711-1776) treatment reads more like a 
denial, rather than an affirmation, of personal identity.  One of his first criticisms targets 
the fact that many philosophers of his day assume that we are intimately aware of our 
self.  As noted earlier, both Descartes and Reid made such assumptions.  Descartes drew 
on the belief that the nature of the self is revealed through introspection, while Reid 
argued that our identity is so simple a concept that any further proof only weakens the 
evidence of it. 
 Hume provides an explicit description of what he believes it takes for us to 
provide evidence for the existence of the self.  In doing so, he also defines what others 
have traditionally believed it means to understand the self.  For example, he states: 
It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea.  But self 
or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several 
impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have a reference.  If any impression 
must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; 
since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner.  But there is no 
impression constant and invariable.  Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, 
passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same 
time.  It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any 
other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such 
idea.13 
 
 Hume’s idea, then, is that the self is not an immaterial substance in the Cartesian 
sense – one that can exist apart from the body, and which is seemingly present throughout 
our lives.  Rather, he argues that our idea of the self is really an illusion created by the 
continuous overlapping of our sense-perceptions.  If we remove these perceptions, we 
will not find some sort of immaterial phantom to which they are somehow attached, he 
argues.  Instead, Hume states that the total removal or absence of perceptions is 
equivalent to annihilation, or a non-entity (252). 
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 To what do we owe this apparent confusion about immaterial substances?  It is 
Hume’s belief that the problem arises from the way we judge the resemblance of objects.  
That is, where we typically attribute identity to an object, we should in fact attribute 
resemblance or similitude.  This notion is not unique to Hume, for Reid also argued for 
this position (206).  However, Reid was not drawn to Hume’s conclusion that there is, 
therefore, no permanent self. 
 Arguably, there is no evidence (i.e., no conclusive evidence) to support the 
concept of immaterial substances.  A significant part of the problem is that we cannot 
conceive of ways to go about verifying or testing for the existence of such substances.  
How does one measure (i.e. account for) the properties of immaterial substances?  We 
will pursue this problem in detail in the following chapters.  To the extent that we have 
little reason to believe in the existence of immaterial substances, we find some degree of 
support for Hume’s denial of the self as such.  This sentiment is implied by Paul 
Churchland when he writes, “If this is the correct account of our origins, then there seems 
neither need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into our 
theoretical account of ourselves.  We are creatures of matter.  And we should learn to live 
with that.” (21). 
 Does this kind of materialism necessitate Hume’s conclusion that we have no idea 
of the self?  Unless we are willing to admit that our concept of self is really an empty 
concept, then I think the self must at least exist as some kind of idea.  That is to say, we 
must at least have some idea of the self, no matter how vague or definitive, if our 
assertions about the self are to be applicable to something.  Dennett reinforces this when 
he states, “If selves are anything, then they exist.”14  In Chapter 3, we will see that 
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Anthony Quinton agrees, because he believes that we can talk about the “nonbodily 
aspect of a person,”15 without reference to an immaterial substance. 
 What are we to make of Hume’s claim that real ideas derive from single sense-
impressions?  Depending on how strictly we wish to interpret Hume’s words, some 
potential problems can arise.  A strict interpretation of Hume yields some peculiar results.  
For instance, strictly speaking, it seems we could argue that nothing we observe results 
from a single impression.  Hume’s objection was that there was no single impression or 
idea that gives rise to the self, because it is his assumption that, if the self exists, then it is 
simple and must arise from a single impression.  Let us suppose we are observing an 
object, such as an oak tree.  Do we describe the oak tree as a real idea that issues from a 
single sense-impression?  Clearly, there are many sense-impressions that make up our 
idea of the oak tree.  There is the impression we receive by looking at it, as well as those 
we receive if we touch it or smell it, or, if peculiarly hungry, taste it.  So, it is not from a 
single sense-impression that we get our idea of the tree, but from several such 
impressions. 
Are we to conclude, then, that all observable objects are products of our 
imagination?  The question is, then – what qualifies as a single sense-impression?  Is 
everything we experience about the oak tree collectively counted as a single sense-
impression, since it is a single object, or do we break down the oak tree into the 
information we receive through our individual senses?  If the latter, then this seems to 
imply not only that there is no single impression of the self, but also that there is no 
single impression of anything.  The implied result is that everything is a product of our 
imagination.  
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 Hume’s account regards the self as a kind of abstraction, created by our 
imagination’s ability to feign the unity of our sense-perceptions.  For example, according 
to Hume’s descriptions of the self, we can think of it as analogous to our concept of a 
crowd.  That is, when we observe a crowd, all we really observe is a collection of 
individuals, which is unified into an organized whole by our imagination.  The crowd is 
essentially an abstraction our brain creates in order to categorize the collection of 
individuals.  Accordingly, a crowd exists as a description (i.e. a compound of ideas, as 
opposed to a simple idea), but not as something real.  As such, individual members of the 
crowd can change, along with the actual size of the group, without necessarily affecting 
our description.  Although we are not likely to say that the crowd is the same crowd if 
many of its original members leave, nevertheless we use the same description to apply to 
any significant number of individuals.  We have no single impression of the crowd.  
What we have, rather, is a collection of the impressions of individuals.  Similarly, 
regarding the self, says Hume, we have no single impression of it, but instead have a 
collection of individual sense-impressions, occurring uninterruptedly.  So, the two are 
analogous in that we have a concept (crowd) that unifies the individuals we perceive as a 
group, just as we have a concept (self) that unifies our individual sense-impressions. 
 It is clear that Hume expected to find a single impression of the self, if such a 
phenomenon were to exist.  Since he believed his introspection failed to reveal this 
impression, he was brought to the conclusion that there is no such thing as the self.  
Accordingly, we create the illusion of a continued self from the overlapping of our 
perceptions.  The perceptions themselves, Hume argues, are all we truly perceive, not a 
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continued self.  For he states, “I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, 
and never can observe any thing but the perception.” (Hume, 252). 
 Hume’s concept of the feigned production of a self, through the imagination, has 
become known as the bundle theory of the self, because it maintains that our self is really 
nothing more than a bundle of disjointed perceptions, which are seemingly unified by the 
imagination.  We must return to the idea that both he and Reid agreed upon, in order to 
understand more fully why Hume adopts this position. 
 What we find in Reid and in Hume are the beginnings of what is commonly 
referred to, nowadays, as type and token identity.  Identity is divided into two basic 
descriptive categories, using this distinction.  Perhaps the best example of describing this 
idea is done as Derek Parfit does, speaking in terms of qualitative and numerical 
identity.16  A type identity, then, is identity of similar kind or category.  A token identity, 
in contrast, is a specific member or instance of a type identity.  For example, Reid argues 
that identity cannot be applied to our sensations or any operations of the mind, because 
“The pain felt this day is not the same individual pain which I felt yesterday, though they 
may be similar in kind and degree, and have the same cause.” (202).  Similarly, Hume 
states, “Thus a man, who hears a noise, that is frequently interrupted and renew’d, says, it 
is still the same noise; tho’ ‘tis evident the sounds have only a specific identity or 
resemblance, and there is nothing numerically the same, but the case, which produc’d 
them.” (258). 
 Hume’s argument, like that of Reid, is that we mistakenly attribute identity in 
cases that are merely instances of similitude.  This position rests on a very strict 
conception of identity, where only a one-one relation qualifies as genuine identity.  For 
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instance, a one-one relation states that a thing is only equal to itself (e.g., A=A).  Since 
various perceptions such as emotions and sounds happen in individual instances, we 
cannot therefore, strictly speaking, attribute identity to them over time.  Other instances 
of what we would call the same emotions or sounds are, accordingly, instances of exact 
similitude, rather than genuine identity. 
Each instance Hume and Reid described above is a separate perception united 
only by resemblance.  Hume believes that our mistaken application of identity happens 
because of our concepts regarding change.  That is, he claims that 1) the amount of 
change a body undergoes, in proportion to the whole, is what determines how the mind 
ascribes identity, and that 2) we are less likely to say identity is destroyed if change is 
gradual, rather than sudden and all at once (Hume, 256).  His conclusion is that what 
generally counts as identity, is merely a quality attributed to these perceptions by uniting 
their ideas in the imagination when they are reflected upon (Hume, 260). 
 Memory is also a phenomenon that Hume believes contributes to personal 
identity.  However, unlike Locke’s treatment, he claims that we can extend our personal 
identity beyond memory to include those things we have forgotten, but could possibly 
remember, since there are things that we did and thought, which we cannot recall, yet 
they are part of our pasts.  Without memory, says Hume, we would have no notion of 
causation or the chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person (261-62).  
This point is put to the test when we consider problems such as amnesia – a total memory 
loss.  Yet, even in instances like amnesia, we find that what we may say varies based 
upon how we define the concepts associated with the problem.  For example, in the next 
chapter we will see that there are various ways we can conceptualize amnesia.  The 
 34 
assertions we make about the effects of amnesia on personal identity will be determined 
by what we consider amnesia to be.  This brings us to the conclusion Hume makes in his 
writing – that the questions we have about personal identity are not really philosophical 
in nature, but are, rather, regarded as grammatical matters (262).  I think we will see more 
light brought to bear on this idea as we continue along our examination in the chapters 
ahead. 
 Hume’s conclusion, above, is no small charge against the logical foundations of 
Descartes’ and Locke’s arguments, because what Hume implies is that all of the work 
regarding the analysis of personal identity thus far has been done on dubious grounds.  
The result is that we must use an entirely different approach to the problem.  A further 
consequence, as we will see, is that there is a degree of open-endedness, or an arbitrary 
nature to the answers of our questions about personal identity. 
In fact, what I will show is that even though contemporary philosophers may or 
may not agree with Hume’s bundle theory and his ideas about the self, what we find is 
that this one kernel of thought – that personal identity is ultimately a matter of 
grammatical convention, not a philosophical difficulty – characterizes, at some level, the 
majority of contemporary discussions.  In order to demonstrate this, however, we must 
further examine the concepts introduced in this chapter.  Our focus now turns to the 
contemporary counterparts of what we found in Descartes, Locke, and Hume.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MENTAL PHENOMENA 
 
Mental Phenomena and Personal Identity 
 We will now examine the various aspects of personal identity typically 
classified as mental phenomena.  Although it is arguable that mental states are 
ultimately reducible to physical states, it is not my goal to pursue such a question 
here.  Rather, I am merely using the description mental to distinguish the various 
phenomena that we often associate with the brain.  This examination is broken down 
into two primary themes: the memory criterion and the psychological criterion.  Both 
play an important role in contemporary discussions about personal identity – the 
memory criterion, for its origins in Locke’s treatment and his influence on modern 
thought about personal identity; the psychological criterion, since it has developed out 
of our discussions about memory. 
 My purpose here is not to support or reject either of these theories.  Instead, I 
am merely presenting the claims of each, then examining the objections and 
criticisms often raised against them.  In the chapters ahead, I will offer more of my 
own remarks about memory and psychological continuity, as they pertain to our 
personal identity, and discuss why I think that both of these criteria fail to provide us 
with a conclusive definitive theory. 
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The Memory Criterion 
 One of the first things we notice, when examining most contemporary 
discussions of memory, is that it is often categorized into several types, rather than 
being viewed as a generalized phenomenon.  For example, both Perry1 and 
Shoemaker (Shoemaker and Swinburne, 86-87) make a distinction between event 
memory and factual memory.  Event memory is the type that occurs when we 
remember an actual experience from our past, e.g. remembering our high school 
graduation ceremony.  Factual memory, by contrast, is remembering that something 
is true.  A genuine causally connected experience with the fact in question is not a 
necessity in such a case, since factual memory can (and does) expand beyond the 
limits of one’s personal experiences.  That is, we can all remember that Columbus 
sailed from Spain in 1492, yet there is no one alive today who actually witnessed this 
event.  So, then, the difference between these two types of memory is that, in one 
case, the person remembering was actually present at the time of the event, while in 
the other case a fact is merely made evident. 
Being present for an event type memory is what Perry refers to as the 
Witnessing Condition (Personal Identity 144).  The development of this kind of 
argument, we shall see, is what caused the memory criterion of personal identity to 
evolve into the broader concept of the psychological criterion.  The importance of the 
Witnessing Condition, and similar ideas, lies in the need for memory verification. 
Verification becomes important when we begin to examine the truth-value of 
memories.  That is, philosophers make a distinction between a genuine memory claim 
and one that is only seeming to remember.  These seemingly genuine memories are 
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referred to by various names, such as apparent memories or false memories.  Richard 
Swinburne (9) refers to notions of strong memory (an actually remembered event) 
and weak memory (false memory).  No matter the terminology, we clearly understand 
there is a difference between something that is an actual, genuine memory of past 
experience, and something that is mistakenly believed to be part of one’s past 
experience.  How then are we to determine whether a memory is genuine or false? 
 When we make a memory claim, we are making an assertion about something 
from the past.  Typically, when we speak about personal identity, we are making 
statements about something, which we believe to be applicable to our own past.  Yet, 
not all assertions about our past may be the same.  Bernard Williams states that we 
make three kinds of distinctions about our own past: 1) recalling, 2) reminding, and 3) 
learning again.2  In the first case, there is no occurrence of new input, writes 
Williams.  The second and third instances involve partial new input and total new 
input, respectively. 
An example of recalling is the immediate recital (i.e. logically immediate, or 
without being prompted) of some fact with which we are familiar, such as our name 
or age.  In such a case, we are simply reciting a fact without hesitation or forethought.  
We can think of recollection as effortless, because there is no need for external 
assistance and the information is something with which we are immediately aware.  
Reminding is a situation where we are familiar with a fact, but it is not evident to us 
without some sort of external prompting.  For instance, I may have forgotten about 
playing a game of Pin the Tail on the Donkey at my fifth birthday party, until 
reminded by my parents.  An important point here, however, is that the prompting 
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must actually cause me to remember the event, and not merely cause me to seem to 
remember.  Clearly, there are often times when we hear stories recounted to us 
repeatedly, for which there comes a point when we question whether or not we 
actually recall the event or merely its recounting.  It is quite possible that hearing such 
stories makes us seem to recall the event, simply because we have heard the story so 
many times, when in fact we have no real recollection of what occurred. 
In the last case, learning again, there is a fact with which I was once familiar, 
but cannot now recall, even with another’s prompting.  Perhaps, when I was very 
young, I learned a bit of a foreign language, which I had not spoken for 15 years 
afterwards.  If no prompting allowed me to recall any of the things I previously knew 
about this language, then I would have to relearn as someone with no previous 
exposure to the language.  Williams addresses these distinctions while discussing the 
notion of memory and its causal connections.  His idea here is that a memory must be 
causally linked to a past experience in some way.  Furthermore, Williams states that 
our memories operate in connection with our emotions, both presently and for our 
future.  Our reactions and emotions, he continues, can be expected to change, if our 
memories about these events are changed (Problems of the Self 188). 
 Addressing this concept of causal connections, Perry concludes, similarly, that 
memory is not so much explained by the accuracy of the claim as it is in terms of a 
relation (Personal Identity 149).  This relation adopts the same kind of historical tone 
we read in Williams, in that experiences that bind identity, as it were, must be 
connected or linked in a special way.  The causal chain that links us to our past, then, 
is of greatest importance for validating memory claims.  Accordingly, we go about 
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validating a memory claim by tracing backward along the history or lineage of such a 
causal chain; in much the same way we would retrace a family history to discover our 
family’s lineage.  To illustrate this notion, we can think of the individual members of 
our family tree as analogous to the individual experiences of a person – we must be 
connected to past experiences, by memory, in the same kind of determinate way we 
are connected to members of the previous generations of our family.  But is it 
possible to have this kind of determination with regard to memories? 
 Although we now have an idea of what would constitute a genuine memory 
and a false memory, there are other problems to consider about the memory criterion.  
For instance, it becomes obvious that if we try to use our own memory as the sole 
means of validating claims about our past experience, then our attempt is self-
referential.  This is like reading a story in a newspaper and then, in order to verify the 
accuracy of the article, purchasing another copy of the same newspaper.3  There is no 
external verification in such a situation. 
 When we speak about verifying a memory claim, we must not adopt the 
extreme skeptical view sometimes present during discussions of verification.  Instead, 
the kind of verification we are seeking is more akin to what Alfred Jules Ayer has in 
mind, when he distinguishes between practical verifiability and verifiability in 
principle.  He perfectly summarizes this when stating, “For it must surely be admitted 
that, however strong the evidence in favour of historical statements may be, their 
truth can never become more than highly probable.”4  It is clear why this is so 
important for discussions about the memory criterion.  As we have seen, memory 
claims assert something about the past, thus making them a brand of historical 
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statement – a description relevant to both event and factual memory statements.  
Since, then, we can never be certain about historical statements, we only need to 
concern ourselves with the practical verification of memory claims.  In other words, 
all we are looking for to verify a memory claim is something more substantial than 
the words coming out of our mouths.  Personal testimony about one’s own past is, by 
itself, insufficient. 
 An external source of verification is a necessity recognized by both Williams 
and Shoemaker.5  They agree that there must be some sort of documentation or 
testimony of others, which allows us the ability to sort fact from imagination.  Yet, as 
Williams observes, all this will tell us is whether or not a particular body was present 
at a given time (Problems of the Self 6).  He introduces this notion because one could 
argue, for various reasons, that bodily identity is not a criterion of personal identity.5 
Perry, on the other hand, introduces a different, potentially larger problem 
regarding memory.  He states that we have no common understanding of the causal 
mechanisms of memory, and that “no such process can be observed by the ordinary 
man, introspectively or otherwise.”(Personal Identity 146-47).  This is no trivial 
claim; it is a glaring reminder of the limits of what we know about brain processes at 
this time.  Yet, Perry’s assertion need not herald the end for theories that rest upon the 
memory criterion.  Only if we insist that we must understand the causal mechanisms 
of memory, before being able to theorize about the phenomenon, does Perry’s 
statement create difficulty. 
While Perry’s observation about memory may be true, it certainly has not 
stopped us from theorizing about the memory criterion.  Perhaps, we may argue, 
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understanding the causal mechanisms of memory is not necessary for constructing a 
theory of memory criterion.  In the same way we do not have to understand how an 
engine operates, in order to drive a car or teach someone how to drive, perhaps there 
is no conflict in our theorizing about memory, without first knowing the fundamental 
workings behind the phenomenon.  After all, we may not know what causes memory, 
but we certainly know what memory does.  As Shoemaker observes, “…if the word 
‘remember’ is to have any meaning it must be possible to establish whether someone 
is using it correctly.”(Personal Identity 128).  He believes that this involves observing 
how a person uses the word in various circumstances over a period of time.  And 
maybe that is all we need to know to apply it to our concepts of personal identity. 
Furthermore, Shoemaker argues that the fact that memory claims are generally 
true is a conceptual truth (Personal Identity 129).  This means that it is part of our 
concept of persons, he argues, that they are able to make true statements about their 
past.  Shoemaker asserts that the truth-value of a memory claim is a conceptual truth 
for three reasons: 1) he believes that the memory criterion is not the sole criterion of 
personal identity; 2) he believes bodily criterion is not the sole criterion of personal 
identity; 3) he believes that we must have some way that is not self-referential to 
verify our memory claims. 
Shoemaker’s conclusion, then, is that we really use no criterion when making 
claims about personal identity.  Instead, he argues, the verification of our memory 
claims comes from our conceptual truth about persons, which states that persons can 
generally make true memory claims about their own past.  While it is generally true 
that persons make accurate claims about their past, as Shoemaker asserts, I am not 
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sure about his notion of it being a conceptual truth about persons.  Examining a 
problem case may help demonstrate the difference between Shoemaker’s claim of 
conceptual truth and what I believe is a matter of contingency. 
When Memory Fails 
 Before examining amnesia to test Shoemaker’s assertion that the truth-value 
of memory claims is a conceptual truth of persons, let us briefly explore what can be 
said about the phenomenon in general, as it applies to the memory criterion.  Amnesia 
is an obvious stumbling block for any theory of personal identity that attempts to rest 
solely on the memory criterion.  Yet, this obstacle can be overcome, if we are willing 
to make certain qualifications to the memory thesis.  If a total memory loss occurs, 
then how do we account for personal identity?  Let us weigh the options.  In a case of 
amnesia, we can say that 1) personal identity is destroyed, 2) personal identity is 
changed to some degree, but not completely, or 3) personal identity is unaffected.  I 
suggest that how we answer this depends on the importance we place on the memory 
criterion’s role in defining personal identity, which, in turn, depends on how we 
define persons. 
 In the first case, we would maintain that personal identity consists solely of 
memory and, therefore, a total memory loss will destroy one’s identity.  The problem 
with this position is twofold: we must be able to demonstrate that personal identity 
consists solely of the memory criterion, and we must be able to demonstrate that a 
total memory loss is possible.  Swinburne states, “Quite clearly, we do allow not 
merely the logical possibility, but the frequent actuality of amnesia – a person 
forgetting all or certain stretches of his past life.” (24). 
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 Swinburne’s statement does not allow us to draw any definitive conclusions, 
however.  Even though we do recognize amnesia as an actually occurring 
phenomenon, it is not always defined as the total memory loss he describes.  
Shoemaker believes amnesia does not pose a problem for the memory theory, because 
it never renders a total memory loss in the strict sense (Shoemaker and Swinburne, 
86).  Similarly, Perry thinks a person’s identity is preserved during amnesia, if we are 
willing to employ the notion of possible memories.  That is, if we include memories 
that one “would have if he hadn’t been conked on the head,”6 then memory is still 
person preserving.  Otherwise, the memory criterion is too stringent to allow personal 
identity to persist in such cases. 
The fact that we hear about instances where people recover memories, 
gradually or suddenly, seems to support Shoemaker’s position.  But this does not 
mean, therefore, that his assertion holds in all cases.  There may be cases where, as 
Swinburne suggests, memory is permanently and totally lost.  A total memory loss is 
certainly not a logical impossibility, nor an absurdity.  Even if such a case never 
arises, we cannot dismiss Swinburne’s claim outright, as it is at the very least 
philosophically important because it is a conceivable case, and should therefore be 
entertained during our examination of amnesia and its possible effect on personal 
identity. 
 In the second case, we claimed that amnesia causes personal identity to 
change by some degree, but not completely.  There are several reasons why this 
would be considered a suitable description.  To begin, even though persons suffer 
from amnesia they are still the same physical body.  And, as we have seen, it is 
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doubtful that amnesia causes a total memory loss in the strict sense.  Personal identity 
is therefore changed, we might reason, by the degree of memory loss.  This argument 
deviates from the idea that the memory criterion is the sole criterion of personal 
identity.  Instead, this theory rests on the claim that bodily identity, at least to some 
degree, is also a criterion for determining personal identity, or that other mental 
criteria must be considered in order to determine personal identity.  The inclusion of 
other mental phenomena is developed in the concept of psychological continuity.  Of 
the various phenomena that sustain psychological continuity, memory is merely one 
aspect (Shoemaker and Swinburne, 90). 
However, this second case also allows us the possibility of claiming that, even 
if a person cannot remember anything about his/her past, this is not enough to destroy 
personal identity.  In this instance, our theory rests on an assertion like Perry’s notion 
that possible memories prohibit a total memory loss.  Part of this claim rests on the 
assumption that, although inaccessible, our memories are still in there somewhere.  I 
find this assertion as unsatisfying as one that begins from a belief in immaterial 
substances, in that both are beyond the realm of verifiability. 
Clearly, it is arguable that personal identity is not a matter of degree and, 
therefore, this second version of the theory cannot account for it.  Personal identity, it 
may be said, is all-or-nothing and is therefore determinate or determinable at any 
given time.  The all-or-nothing position defines personal identity as a one-one 
relationship, in that a thing at time T1 is the same thing that exists at time T2.  I will 
discuss this idea at length later in this chapter. 
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 The third case allowed us to claim that personal identity is entirely unaffected 
by amnesia.  This means that either 1) the memory criterion plays no role in 
determining our personal identity or 2) no amount of memory loss would change 
what we say about our identity, since total memory loss, in the strict sense, is 
impossible and, furthermore, memory is not the sole criterion that determines 
personal identity.  How would we defend this position?  If our own memories do not 
determine who or what we are, in any way, then what criterion will we use?  The 
typical alternative to the theory of memory criterion is the theory of bodily criterion.   
We will explore this and other options in the next chapter. 
 Now, with regard to Shoemaker’s claim – that a person’s ability to make true 
statements about his/her memories is a conceptual truth – what sort of assertions can 
be made to support or reject its validity?  If the fact that persons can generally make 
true statements about their memories is a conceptual truth, then how is this affected 
by the possibility of amnesia, if at all?  If we grant Shoemaker’s claim, then it appears 
we can say two things: 1) People who suffer from amnesia are no longer persons, or 
2) personal identity is not affected by the person’s state of amnesia.  Here, as before, 
what we will say depends on what we accept as a viable definition of amnesia.  Since 
Shoemaker rejects a total memory loss in the strict sense, he would likely assert the 
second of these two statements.  Although our first statement may seem ridiculous, it 
is nevertheless a condition set up by Shoemaker’s position, unless we absolutely 
reject the idea that amnesia can cause a total memory loss, in the strict sense.  Let us 
set up an example that demonstrates the consequences of not rejecting this claim. 
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 Suppose that Michael Ellis suddenly suffers from amnesia.  If amnesia did, in 
fact, render a total memory loss, then not only would Michael Ellis no longer be the 
same person he once was, he would no longer be a person at all, according to 
Shoemaker’s position.  As such, Michael Ellis fails to satisfy the concept of a person, 
since part of Shoemaker’s concept requires that he be able to make true statements 
about his past.  Our objection here relies on the fact that we describe amnesia as a 
total memory loss, which Shoemaker explicitly rejects.  Yet, as I stated earlier, a total 
memory loss is neither a logical impossibility nor an absurdity. The fact that 
Shoemaker rejects a total memory loss does not preclude the possibility of such an 
event.  Given this, I think we cannot accept Shoemaker’s claim as a conceptual truth, 
but rather as a contingent one. 
The Psychological Criterion 
 As we have already seen, one of the criticisms of the memory criterion, 
particularly of Locke’s treatment, is that it is too limited.  That is, if we read Locke’s 
position quite literally we might state that a complete account of personal identity 
must include properties such as character, values, intentions, and the like.  However, 
some, such as Perry7, state charitably that Locke would agree with this idea, based on 
the “level headedness” he demonstrates in the Essay.  While this is certainly possible, 
I prefer not to speculate about what Locke might say were he still among the quick.  
What cannot be denied, however, is that these properties certainly do provide much 
vitality for our discussions about personal identity.  The addition of these features has 
helped develop the memory criterion into the psychological criterion.  And, as we 
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will see, having a fundamental tie to the memory criterion brings many similar 
problems into discussions about the psychological criterion. 
 The psychological criterion is broken down into two fundamental ideas: 
psychological continuity and psychological connectedness.  When we speak about 
psychological continuity, we are referring to the holding of an over-lapping chain of 
psychological relations.8  Similarly, psychological connectedness refers to the 
holding, over time, of particular direct relations.  Continuity, then, is a concept more 
concerned with our immediate relations.  That is, we look for moment-to-moment 
continuations of these relations and, therefore, continuity can be defined without 
degree.  Yet, connectedness has degrees, since these direct relations (memory, 
character, intention) hold variously during different parts of our life (Identities 98).  
David Lewis describes continuity as “the existence of step-by-step paths from here to 
there, with extremely strong local connectedness from each step to the next,” 
(Identities 18) and connectedness as “direct relations of similarity and causal 
dependence between my present mental state and each of its successors.” (Identities 
18). 
 We can already begin to see the similarities between this position and the 
memory criterion.  Both are concerned with a kind of causal link or connection of 
mental phenomena.  The primary difference is that the psychological criterion goes 
on to include the relations of character, values, desires, intentions, etc.  We now have 
a way in which one’s identity may hold, even if a total memory loss were possible.  
Since memory is no longer the sole criterion of the concept, our identity may persist 
based on the strength of the relations of these other psychological relations, even if 
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we lose our memories.  Shoemaker believes this is a revision that answers Locke’s 
critics, since what is needed is “that one have ‘memory continuity’ with that past self-
memory continuity consisting in the occurrence of a chain of memory-connected 
person-stages….” (Shoemaker and Swinburne, 81). 
 The theory of personal identity based on the psychological criterion is often 
referred to as the Reductive View, because our identity, as such, is described in terms 
of various inter-connected relations, rather than in terms of a single subject of 
experience.  This reductive classification is a byproduct of Cartesianism.  Materialism 
is traditionally described as a reductionist view of the dualist theory of mind, so too is 
the psychological criterion described with regard to personal identity.  With the 
rejection of the traditional view, we will see some rather peculiar explanations about 
persons and their identities, especially when we examine many of the proposed 
problem cases. 
 The psychological criterion, like the memory criterion, is understood as a kind 
of causal relation.  That is, it was posited that memories must be linked to our past in 
a special way, i.e. they must represent our involvement in an actual event.  In this 
way, a causal chain links us to that event.  The concepts of continuity and 
connectedness are the means that explain causal relations for the psychological 
criterion.  Therefore, we are addressing instances of sameness of character, sameness 
of values, and of intentions.  But, as we saw, these are relationships that hold by 
matters of degree.  How then does this affect our view of personal identity? 
 An aspect of psychological connectedness, advanced by Parfit, is the 
Psychological Spectrum.  This concept explains how we understand connectedness as 
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a matter of degree.  In the near end of this spectrum, he states, there is no change in a 
person’s psychology.  At the far end, however, all memories are lost and replaced by 
apparent memories (Reasons and Persons 232).  Although Parfit mentions only 
memories here, we can just as easily imagine that the spectrum involves properties 
such as character, values, intentions and other mental phenomena, since this has been 
included in our concept of the psychological criterion.  But Parfit does not limit his 
explanation to mental phenomena.  He also describes a Physical Spectrum and a 
Combined Spectrum as part of his theory.  Both of these notions operate like the 
Psychological Spectrum, i.e. there is someone completely continuous at the near end, 
but totally dissociated at the far end.  So, then, a person who is the same from one 
time to another will be at the near end of the Combined Spectrum (i.e., the near end of 
both the Psychological and Physical Spectrum).  As we move further toward the far 
end, the person is less similar and, therefore, less of a continuous person with the 
original. 
 When we ask, “Will this still be me or someone else?” we typically assume 
that this question has a determinate answer.  Our common sense seems to tell us that 
there should be a sharp borderline that allows us to determine, at any given time, 
whether a person is the same or not, from one time to another.  Yet, a sharp borderline 
such as this is something Parfit denies, unless, he says, we are willing to say that we 
are separately existing entities, in the Cartesian sense, which of course he rejects 
(Reasons and Persons 239).  Instead, he argues that there is no fact involved which is 
all-or-nothing; a person’s physical and psychological connectedness could hold to any 
degree.  This alternative to the all-or-nothing view implies that we arbitrarily choose a 
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point at which we call a person the same, since there is no objective means to 
determine where such a borderline would lie.  And it is this idea that Parfit accepts, 
for he states, “We must pick some point on this Spectrum, up to which we will call 
the resulting person me, and beyond which we will call him someone else.  Our 
choice of this point will have to be arbitrary.” (Reasons and Persons 241)  He 
concludes, similarly, “By drawing our line, we have chosen to give an answer to this 
question.” (Reasons and Persons 241).  This idea is not unique to Parfit, however.  
Lewis affirms this idea, but, unlike Parfit, he offers what he thinks is a solution to 
making an arbitrary decision about where to create such a cutoff point.  For instance, 
like Parfit, he says that when dealing with matters of degree we can introduce a cutoff 
point, and that this choice is arbitrary.  The solution, Lewis argues, is that when we 
are faced with an arbitrary choice, the thing to do is not make the choice.9 
How do we get around making an arbitrary decision, as described above by 
Parfit and Lewis?  Lewis believes we avoid arbitrary choice by adopting the ideas of 
person-stages and tensed identity, i.e. identity at a particular time (36-37).  By doing 
so, he believes that we can claim both survival and identity are what matter for 
personal identity (Lewis, 18-19).  However, he does admit there is a discrepancy in 
the way we view these concepts: 
He who says that what matters in survival is a relation of 
mental continuity and connectedness is speaking of a 
relation among more or less momentary person-stages, or 
time-slices of continuant persons, or persons-at-times.  He 
who says that what matters in survival is identity, on the 
other hand, must be speaking of identity among temporally 
extended continuant persons with stages at various times. 
(Lewis, 20). 
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We will turn to a detailed examination of tensed identity later in this chapter.  
For the present time, we turn our attention to some of the problem cases of the 
psychological criterion.  In doing so, we will be able to see how well our traditional 
concepts of persons hold up under hypothetical circumstances. 
Division, Replication and other Problems 
 Two important concepts that are often explored in problem cases are division 
and replication of persons.  Numerous hypothetical situations have been created to 
illustrate these ideas.  Parfit describes a case of identical triplets involved in an 
accident, in which one brain is halved between the two surviving brothers.  That is, 
the accident renders two of the three brain dead, while the third has a functioning 
brain and mutilated body.  Therefore, the working brain is split between the two vital 
bodies.  Under these circumstances, Parfit believes we can say that one of the 
following options must happen: 1) the original person associated with the brain does 
not survive; 2) the person survives as one of the two people; 3) the person survives as 
the other of the two; 4) the person survives as both (Reasons and Persons 254-256).  
What objections might we make about these claims? 
 Parfit states that we can object to the first claim, above, because survival can 
occur if half of the brain is successfully transplanted.  Therefore, how can a double 
success be a failure?  He also claims that the second and third are implausible, 
because there is nothing that should qualify either of the two as the genuine survivor, 
while excluding the other.  Hence, he says, “If I survived as one and not the other, 
then the other would falsely think he was me.  But I have no way of knowing if I am 
the one with the false belief.  This is inconclusive, therefore.” (Reasons and Persons 
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258)  The only explanation is that the fourth claim is correct.  Yet, it is arguable that 
we might also assert that there is now one person living in two bodies.  Parfit admits 
that this claim cannot be dismissed outright (Reasons and Persons 256). 
 The two brothers receiving the divided brain are very closely connected to the 
original person.  If we suppose that each half of the brain possessed the same contents 
as the other (e.g. both had all of the same memories, etc.), then the two are 
psychologically identical with the original person.  However, even if we do not grant 
this supposition, the two brothers are still very closely connected to the original 
person.  Connectedness becomes less distinctive further away from the source of 
origin.  A greater amount of division involved in an instance results in less connection 
(Reasons and Persons 300). 
Shoemaker states that our concept of personal identity must be compatible 
with the logical principles that govern identity in general (Shoemaker and Swinburne, 
71).  This creates yet another problem, since identity is considered a transitive, one-
one relationship.  Thus, there is a direct conflict between our concept of identity and 
the psychological criterion, since this criterion admits to be a matter of degree and, 
furthermore, can be a one-many relationship.10  For this reason, some philosophers 
think that we must abandon the idea of personal identity; or they argue that what 
matters is not identity, but survival.  Others, however, simply see this as an admission 
of the failure of the psychological criterion to explain personal identity.  Williams 
agrees that, in cases of fission, identity does not hold, since spatio-temporal 
continuity is broken (Problems of the Self 24). 
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Replication presents problems similar to those we witness in cases of division.  
For the purposes of discussing the psychological criterion, mental replication usually 
involves the concept of brain replication or merely the contents of one’s brain being 
replicated.  Although division is a form of replication, there is another type of 
replication I now have in mind, namely duplication.  Williams, like Parfit, believes 
that replication contradicts the concept of identity.  His examination helps clarify how 
we are to understand this by making a distinction between identity and exact 
similitude.  To illustrate this, we can think of so-called identical twins.  While we use 
identical to describe such people, they are not identical in the strict sense, since they 
are numerically different.  What we really mean when we call them identical is that 
their appearance is exactly similar.  For, even though they look similar, nevertheless, 
they have separate personal lives and are in different spatio-temporal points. 
There are several reasons why spatio-temporal continuity is a consideration 
worthy of our attention.  To begin, we can think of its application as a type of 
historical enquiry, not unlike the causal chain associated with the memory criterion.  
Ideally, this historical procession of events would reveal any instances of 
reduplication, so long as we can trace the histories back far enough (Williams, 24).  
And, as we shall see in the following section, spatio-temporal continuity involves our 
conceptions about time.  When we theorize about personal identity, we generally 
make our assertions based on a linear concept of time.  Yet, I will demonstrate that 
there are some rather peculiar possibilities for our theories of personal identity, if we 
adopt the notion of a non-linear time flow.  Additionally, spatio-temporal continuity 
draws our attention to the importance of the bodily criterion, one might argue.  That 
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is, Williams states, “…it is unclear what it would mean to say that there were two 
men who had exactly similar or the same memories, since to call them memories is to 
imply their correctness.” (Problems of the Self 9).  This observation is made to rule 
out the idea that memory is the sole criterion of personal identity.  In cases where 
memory is replicated, continuity of body must be used in order to verify memory 
claims.  The causal connection traced from one body back to a specific spatio-
temporal point is our only means of distinguishing between two persons claiming to 
have exactly similar memories.  This is affirmed by Williams when he says, “The 
only case in which identity and exact similarity could be distinguished, as we have 
seen, is that of the body….  Thus I should claim that the omission of the body takes 
away all content from the idea of personal identity.” (Problems of the Self 10). 
Williams thinks that if we were to replicate a person’s memory, then we 
introduce the concept of person-types.  He comes to this conclusion by way of the 
notion of an information swap, in which a person’s mental contents are removed from 
his/her brain and mechanically transferred back into the same brain, after a 
reconstructive brain surgery.  If we can do this with the same brain, then the same 
would be possible with an entirely new brain placed in the same body, he argues.  
And, furthermore, the fact that this would work with a new brain implies the 
possibility of duplication and, therefore, his notion of person-types (Problems of the 
Self 79-80). 
Person-types are important for the concept of replacing ideas of personal 
identity with ideas of survival, because they allow us to understand how 
psychological continuity can be a one-many relationship.  I emphasize this as a 
 56 
possibility, rather than a necessity, because in cases where duplication does not occur 
(i.e. under normal conditions) psychological continuity is a one-one relationship.  The 
hypothetical cases merely demonstrate that this need not be so.  Parfit supports this 
idea when he states, “even if psychological continuity is neither logically, nor always 
in fact, one-one, it can provide a criterion of identity.  For this it can appeal to the 
relation of non-branching psychological continuity, which is logically one-one.” (The 
Philosophy of Mind 150). 
Parfit’s claim, then, is that under normal (non-branching) conditions, 
psychological continuity can provide a criterion of personal identity.  If we deny this, 
based on the all-or-nothing view of identity, then Parfit thinks we must abandon the 
language of identity.  We would then speak in a new way, regarding our new 
descriptions as having the same significance as identity (The Philosophy of Mind 
151).  By replacing ‘personal identity’ with ‘survival’ we can do this, he thinks.  
Perry, however, does not think Parfit’s new way of thinking is possible.  He maintains 
that we will merely be abandoning one way of talking about objects in favor or 
another, but that there will still be identity among the new objects: “As long as one 
has predication, one will have identity….”(Identities 87).  To this extent, I think I 
must agree with Perry.  I see no difference in the logical tone of questions such as, 
“Will I really survive from my present state to a future state?” and “In twenty years 
will I be identical with the person I am now?”  Both questions seek to answer the 
same fundamental end – At any given future time, will there be someone who really 
is me? 
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Returning to the fourth conclusion, from Parfit’s example above, we can see 
why personal identity could be insufficient to describe this case.  If we refer to both 
of the surviving brothers as Michael Ellis (to whom the original brain belonged), then 
Mr. Ellis will, from this point forward, have two bodies.  Furthermore, each body 
would have a separate history, henceforth – leading to the possibility that one body 
might kill the other.  Would we then say that Michael Ellis killed himself, was then 
convicted of his own murder, and died again in prison 40 years later (The Philosophy 
of Mind 146)?  The standard way we talk about persons does not allow for such cases.  
It seems, then, that we must either change our concept of persons to include these 
cases, or develop a new way of describing these cases that does not imply identity.  
This is exactly what Parfit champions in his idea of survival.  In the chapters to come, 
we will further investigate the role of language in the development of our concepts of 
personal identity. 
Persons Through Time 
 Of all the criteria regarded when constructing a theory of personal identity, 
time is, arguably, the most neglected concept.  In this section, we will discuss some of 
the basic assumptions that all theories of personal identity make with regard to time.  
We will also examine Lewis’ idea that speaking in terms of tensed identity resolves 
the difficulties of personal identity, such as the difficulties of describing what 
happens during cases of fusion and fission, because there are factual descriptions we 
can make about persons at given times during their lives.  That is, tensed identity, we 
shall see, involves the notion that the relations of aggregates of person-stages 
determine our descriptions of a person’s identity. 
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 The most basic assumption made about time and its relation to personal 
identity is that time is a linear phenomenon.  This can be evidenced by the fact that 
none of the standard problem cases of personal identity ever include ideas such as 
time travel or time-loops.  We believe with a great conviction that time flows from 
past to present to future, and that our everyday experiences about the world lend to 
this sensibility.  Yet, if we were to determine otherwise, how would that affect our 
claims about personal identity?  What would we say if time travel to both the past and 
the future became possible?  Perhaps the most abstract example of personal identity 
and time travel comes from science-fiction author Robert A. Heinlein’s story “— All 
You Zombies —”.  In this story, we are introduced to a person who, through sex 
change operations and time travel, is able to become his own father and mother, thus 
giving birth to himself after an intricate series of time loops are established.11 
 Although Heinlein’s example strains comprehensibility with regard to our 
common-sense view of things, if we grant the details of the story (i.e. the 
circumstances and the possibility of time travel), it does not seem entirely implausible 
that such a case might be logically possible.  Without the reader having the full details 
of the story readily available (and for which there is not time nor room enough in this 
thesis to provide), examining Heinlein’s example in full will become quite 
cumbersome.  I point it out here to demonstrate some of the gross peculiarities that 
can occur when we disregard our presumptions about a linear conception of time.  
Instead, I propose to examine a similar, yet slightly subdued example of my own 
creation.  In my example, we will simply consider what we might expect from a 
single leap backwards in time.  I choose time travel specifically because it is an 
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example where we may experience duplication or replication, without the kind of 
bodily destruction found in some of the other problem cases.  That is, in problem 
cases that examine examples such as teleportation, we see that these examples 
involve a complete destruction of the body.  If we create a situation that involves a 
time-loop, then, conceivably, we could experience a peculiar paradox, since there 
would be two identical bodies, without any break in psychological and bodily 
continuity. 
As we have seen, psychological continuity and bodily continuity are both 
considerations for our criteria of personal identity.  We also saw that it was arguable 
that duplication destroys personal identity, because identity is, strictly speaking, a 
one-one relation.  Suppose that Michael Ellis builds himself a time machine.  Being a 
rather conservative fellow, he decides that his initial test of the device should not be 
overly extravagant.  Let us suppose that he sets his first leap through time for ten 
minutes into the past.  Checking both his watch and the wall clock in his lab, he finds 
that both read 2:30 pm.  He steps into the machine, configures the appropriate 
settings, and braces himself in his seat. 
 After a brief jolting of the machine, Michael Ellis opens the door and steps out 
to find himself still inside his lab.  Immediately, he checks the time on his watch 
against the wall clock.  The wall clock reads 2:20pm.  The leap was successful.  As 
Mr. Ellis peers around the lab, he spies a man performing advanced calculations on a 
chalkboard hanging on the back wall.  He approaches the man at the chalkboard, taps 
him on the shoulder, and speaks. 
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“I thought I might find you here.  As you can see, our time machine works,” 
stated Ellis.  “It’s ok, don’t be alarmed.  We’re the same person.  I just jumped 
backwards in time by ten minutes,” he assured his counterpart. 
“How can we be the same person – we’re in separate points of space?” asked 
Ellis-2. 
“That’s a good question.  Considering that my body wasn’t destroyed, as 
might happen through teleportation, I should have 100 percent bodily continuity with 
you, yet we both occupy different points in space,” continued Ellis, “and the same 
should be true for my psychological continuity.  At no point has my psychological 
continuity been broken with yours.” 
 “But there is a difference – my bodily and psychological continuity will 
always be ten minutes behind yours.  The clock now reads 2:21.  Your watch should 
read 2:31.  So, in approximately ten minutes my state of continuity will be identical 
with yours as it is now,” claimed Ellis-2. 
“So, we’re different persons?” asked Ellis. 
“Well, how can I be identical with you if I haven’t had all of your current 
experiences?” asked Ellis-2. 
Ellis replied, “You seem to have a good point there.  I appear to have all of 
your experiences, but you lack those that I’ve had for the past eleven minutes.” 
 “Well, not exactly,” said Ellis-2. 
“What do you mean?” asked Ellis. 
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“You don’t have all of my experiences.  By being the first to make the leap 
backwards, you’re missing the experiences I’m having right now by interacting with 
you,” Ellis-2 explained. 
Ellis was baffled.  “But I should have the experiences you’re now having in 
another ten minutes, after you’ve gone into the time machine and are then standing 
here speaking these same words I’m speaking to you now.  Yet, I think there’s 
another difficulty,” Ellis stated. 
“What’s that?” asked Ellis-2. 
“Would you say that we both possess free will?” asked Ellis. 
“Of course we do,” confirmed Ellis-2. 
“Then couldn’t you opt not to enter the time machine at all?  And couldn’t I 
opt to leave the room, so that I didn’t experience your interactions with me as you do 
now, if you did decide to leap?” questioned Ellis.  “If not,” continued Ellis, “then how 
can we claim to have free will?  Are our actions determined for us?” 
 “I’m not sure,” said Ellis-2, “If I don’t make the leap, then it seems to create a 
paradox, in that you shouldn’t be here now talking to me.  But if I can’t make the 
decision not to leap, then, apparently, my actions are already determined for me.” 
 Both were baffled by the situation.  “If you do, in fact, have free will – as we 
generally suppose of all persons – and you choose not to enter the time machine, 
would that pose a threat to me?  Would I simply vanish, since I should not have 
jumped, had you not made the decision to do so?” 
 “It’s hard to know what to say about that,” admitted Ellis-2. 
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“I agree,” said Ellis.  “The problem appears to include that my actions affect 
your timeline, if we are genuinely the same person.  That is, if I refuse to make the 
leap backwards, then, being identical, you should not have been able to do so,” 
claimed Ellis-2. 
The clock on the wall now read 2:25.  “There seems to be two essential 
questions we’re asking here,” stated Ellis, “the first being that we are either identical 
persons, or we are instead exactly similar beings.  If your actions affect my present 
timeline, then we must somehow be identical or, at the very least, causally linked in a 
way that implies identity.  To say that we are merely exactly similar implies that, 
while similar in every respect, we are not causally linked and therefore your actions 
should have no bearing on my timeline.  The second question asks whether we have 
free will, allowing us to choose the course of our own actions, or whether our actions 
are determined for us.” 
 “And we could very well complicate things all the more by both entering the 
time machine together,” said Ellis-2, “and in doing so wind up with three individual 
bodies here, after the leap: you and I – the two time travelers – and the unsuspecting 
gent who will then assume my role in the lab, during this scene.  What do you make 
of this?” 
 They both looked at the wall clock – 2:27.  “I’m not sure,” stated Ellis, “but it 
looks as if there are a number of ways we could continue to complicate our situation, 
if we have free will.  Continually adding our numbers to our time-traveling group, as 
you’ve just indicated, is a perfect example.  It seems we could infinitely duplicate 
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ourselves this way, all the while being psychologically and bodily connected to each 
other, without ever destroying our bodies and with no visible point of fission.” 
 The clock read 2:29.  “What do you think will happen?” asked Ellis-2. 
“I don’t know, but I have a feeling we’re about to find out any minute now,” 
replied Ellis. 
 Although it is difficult to say whether this example accurately describes what 
happens when one travels backwards in time, it is nevertheless plausible to examine 
such a problem case, since the principles of gravity described in Einstein’s theory of 
general relativity account for the possibility of time travel into the past.12  My 
intention is not to provide answers to the questions raised by this example.  Rather, 
my purpose is both to draw attention to the difficulties that arise once we disregard 
linear timeframes, and also draw attention to the fact that time is the most often 
neglected consideration in developing our concepts of personal identity.  As such, our 
general assumption that time unfolds in a linear fashion does not allow our standard 
concepts of personal identity to answer these questions adequately. 
 Our last topic of consideration, the concept of tensed identity, combines 
aspects of our use of language and our concept of time.  Tensed identity is an idea 
introduced by Lewis when he attempts to resolve difficulties that arise in the problem 
cases relating to the fission and fusion of persons.  To begin, Lewis introduces two 
relations dealing with descriptions about persons over time: the R-relation, which 
regards the mental continuity and connectedness among various person-stages; and 
the I-relation, concerned with whether or not there will be a person that exists both 
now and at another time (20-22).  The fundamental difference between these relations 
 64 
is that the R-relation concerns itself with person-stages, whereas the I-relation 
concerns itself with wholly continuant persons, comprised of individual person-
stages.  That is to say, Lewis states that, “A continuant person is an aggregate of 
person-stages, each one I-related to all the rest (and to itself).”(22). 
 The first peculiarity in Lewis’ argument is that he presents us with two 
relations (the R-relation and the I-relation), gives us a description of the difference 
between the two, and then claims that the I-relation is the R-relation.  If they are 
indeed the same relation, then we should find no variation among their collective 
descriptions.  Perhaps what Lewis means is that they are essentially two ways of 
describing the same phenomenon.  Using the familiar example of a glass being either 
half empty or half full, we can understand how it is possible for two descriptions to 
describe the same phenomenon.  In fact, we can even introduce a third description, 
wherein the glass is described as both half empty and half full – the top half being 
empty and the bottom half being full.  Whatever the case may be, the fact remains 
that Lewis describes two relations and claims that the two are actually the same. 
 Lewis next claims that the I-relation is not identity, in the strict sense, but 
ordinarily inherits the formal character of identity (22-23).  The I-relation is important 
for Lewis’ concept of tensed identity, and he draws a distinction between this relation 
and genuine identity for a specific reason.  Tensed identity, says Lewis, is not a kind 
of identity, because speaking in such ways does not necessitate transitivity.  He 
understands that identity, strictly speaking, is a one-one relation and, as such, must be 
transitive.  The I-relation, by contrast, carries the formal character of identity, but is 
not, itself, necessarily transitive.  Indeed, it is a weaker relation that Lewis describes 
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as being transitive under normal circumstances, but is intransitive in problem cases 
where we find overlap of person-stages, such as fission and fusion (25-27). 
 As we have seen, Lewis believes that continuant persons are aggregates of 
person-stages.  Speaking in terms of tensed identity, then, we should be able to 
determine whether or not two continuant persons share person-stages.  For example, 
we can say that continuants C1 and C2 are identical at time T1 if and only if they both 
exist at T1 and their stages at that time are identical (Lewis, 26).  Accordingly, the 
primary focus of tensed identity is to describe persons-at-times.  When we ask a 
question such as “Is person A the same as person B?” we are asking about the states 
of person A and person B at a specific instance.  By Lewis’ reckoning, if we can 
determine whether the stages of person A and person B are identical at the time in 
question, then we can determine whether they are the same person at that time. 
 Why bother with the concept of tensed identity?  To what end does it aim?  As 
Lewis observed, under normal conditions the I-relation is transitive.  His notion of 
tensed identity, then, specifically addresses the problem cases we commonly face 
when discussing philosophical theories of personal identity.  That is, tensed identity 
gives us a way to describe instances where there may be overlap of person-stages 
from different continuant persons, as well as overlap of person-stages within the 
timeline of single continuant persons.  Not only do fission and fusion create these 
problems, but so does longevity (assuming that personalities and memories diminish 
over extended periods of time, similar to what we observe in ordinary human life 
spans). 
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 If for no other reason, I think that Lewis’ argument is useful in that it again 
draws our attention to the concept of time, with regard to personal identity.  In doing 
so, it introduces an implication we have not yet seen considered among the theories 
discussed, namely, that the truth-value of our assertions about personal identity may 
be time-dependent to some degree.  Regarding a definitive theory of personal identity, 
specifically, I do not think Lewis’ position is any more successful than any of the 
others considered throughout our examination.  Even if we speak in terms of tensed 
identity, we cannot escape the arbitrary nature upon which our theory rests. Lewis’ 
foundational description rests on the ideas of mental continuity and connectedness, as 
well as the concept of aggregates of person-stages – none of which are concepts we 
are forced to accept out of logical necessity.  In fact, part of the success of Lewis’ 
position relies on pretending, for argument’s sake, that some of the open-endedness of 
the psychological criterion has been settled (20; 30).  It seems to me that we can make 
statements about persons-at-times, but these are nonetheless made within the relative 
framework we construct about persons, based on contingent criteria of personhood.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BODILY CRITERION AND REDUCTIONISM 
 
Persons and Bodies 
 The issues that create problems for the mind-body distinction and the memory 
criterion have led to the development of the theory of the bodily criterion of personal 
identity.  This theory seeks to resolve the problems of the above by affirming a 
reductionist position, reducing any and all references about a person’s identity to 
matters of a body or a particular part of the body, such as the brain.  Two of the 
primary claims supporting the bodily criterion are: 1) the lack of conclusive evidence 
for the existence of immaterial substances, such as the soul, and 2) the belief that 
persons appear to go where the brain goes.  Let us examine the implications of 
equating persons and bodies at length by first attempting to discredit the validity of 
immaterial substances in the role of determining personal identity. 
Soul Searching 
 If we intend to argue for a theory of personal identity that is based upon the 
concept of an immaterial substance, we must first be able to establish answers for a 
few specific questions.  For example, we need to answer questions such as: 1) What is 
an immaterial substance or soul? 2) Are persons and souls identical? and 3) Is it 
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possible to establish personal identity based on the criterion of an immaterial 
substance?  These questions are the immediate focus of our attention. 
 1) What is an immaterial substance or soul?  Returning to Descartes’ mind-
body distinction, we recall that he claimed he was essentially a soul (i.e., a thinking 
thing) that could exist apart from his body.  This sort of description has become the 
rule for explaining what we typically refer to as the soul.  That is, when we discuss 
ideas about the soul, we are referring to what is described as a disembodied person.  
What is the usefulness or application of such a concept?  According to Anthony 
Quinton, the soul has been used, traditionally, to explain both the vitality that 
distinguishes living and non-living things, and the seat of consciousness (53). 
 Before continuing to examine our three primary questions, I think it is 
important to point out that describing the soul in terms of a disembodied person in no 
way answers our original question – what is an immaterial substance or soul?  
Instead, all that is achieved with such explanation is that we push back our question 
one step, since this answer merely begs the question: What, then, is a disembodied 
person?  It is arguable that a disembodied person is a self-contradictory concept, 
especially if we argue that persons simply are bodies.  This amounts to stating that a 
person is a disembodied body, which is counterintuitive.  However, Quinton believes 
a disembodied person is a viable concept.  If not, he says, then we could not 
understand concepts such as the classic idea of a ghost (Quinton, 62). 
 I think Quinton’s ghost example is inadequate for several reasons.  To begin, 
it is quite obvious that there is no absurdity in claiming that we have the ability to 
describe things that do not necessarily exist.  That is, just because language allows us 
 70 
to give descriptions about certain things, this does not necessitate that there is some 
actually existing thing that fits our description.  For example, my descriptions about 
Lord Wellington – the albino unicorn who lives on the front lawn of the White House, 
in Iowa – need not describe any actually existing thing.  Although this example is 
slightly exaggerated, the same is true for more mundane descriptions.  My 
descriptions about the oriental area rug in my living room need not describe anything 
actual, because there may be no such object in my living room.  The same argument 
could be applied to concepts such as immaterial substance, the soul, ghosts, and the 
like – we can describe them, but this does not mean they exist.1 
Clearly, the argument above can be said to apply to such things as quantum 
particles, dark matter, super strings, and the like, since we do not directly observe 
these things themselves.  The difference, however, is that these objects of scientific 
investigation are not, strictly speaking, posited as actually existing things.  Rather, 
they are representations or models that allow us to describe the workings of the 
phenomena we do observe.  Immaterial substances, by contrast, are not described as 
being representations or models, but are posited as being actually existing things. 
We can also argue that Quinton’s ghost example is not a genuine example of 
what it means to be disembodied.  The classic example of a ghost, in many instances, 
is described as a spiritual or otherworldly human being.  In other words, a ghost is 
described as in every way resembling the form of a human being, only made of 
different stuff.  Given this, we can argue that this ghost stuff, although different from 
the bodies of living beings, is still a form of embodiment.  This argument holds even 
if the ghost does not physically resemble a human being.  For all that concerns the 
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validity of our claim is that this ghost stuff is capable of being classified as another 
type of body or embodiment.  The ghost stuff is no less a body than is that of a human 
being, only made of different stuff.  The kind of disembodiment I have in mind, 
which we might assert as genuine disembodiment, quickly leads us into the realm of 
abstract ideas, since it involves the concept of a property in-and-of itself, which 
describes the condition of a property existing apart from any body. 
 Genuine disembodiment, we might say – the sort that implies self-
contradiction – is described in terms that allow us to ask questions such as: what 
would it mean to describe a person’s attributes or character entirely apart from any 
sort of body?  To understand this concept of disembodiment, let us formulate a few 
questions that exemplify the point.  What would it mean to have wit, charm, and 
arrogance apart from any particular body?  Likewise, what would it mean to have 
memories, thoughts and intentions apart from any particular body?  The problem here 
is similar to the kind we observe regarding the need for properties, such as color and 
shape, to be expressed through bodies or particular objects.  Apart from any particular 
body, we might argue, these qualities are regarded as abstract ideas, rather than real 
properties.  That is to say, the very concept of disembodiment requires that there be 
something that exists apart from the body.  What are the properties, then, of a 
disembodied person?  According to Williams, there are two possible answers for this 
question: 1) that there is no answer, or 2) there is an answer, but the value of the 
answer is always equal to zero.  If the first case is true, says Williams, then: 
…we shall say that the possibility of disembodiment would 
show, not just that a person was a sort of thing that did not 
necessarily exemplify physical determinates, but that it was 
the sort of thing that necessarily did not exemplify such 
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determinables.  Then even embodied persons would not 
have physical attributes, but would be nonphysical things 
associated with a body, i.e., the Cartesian account would 
apply.2 
 
 Yet, we have seen that Williams rejects the Cartesian account, because of the 
difficulty involved in verifying claims regarding immaterial substances.  The second 
answer to our question regarding properties of disembodied persons raises a different 
difficulty, says Williams.  That is, if we claim that these properties have a 
quantifiable value, then we must express them in terms of how they relate to a 
person’s body.  For example, inquiring as to the weight of Michael Ellis would 
include asking about the weight of his physical body, as well as the weight of his 
nonphysical or immaterial substance.  Upon weighing him, we might ask, “Of his 195 
pounds, what percentage of his weight accounts for Michael Ellis’ immaterial 
substance?”  If this immaterial substance suddenly became disembodied as he stood 
on the scale, would we see a drop in the measured weight?  Denying any such change 
requires that, even while embodied, the immaterial substance is a weightless item 
associated with a body. 
 Part of the difficulty of claiming that immaterial substances have no 
determinable attributes, asserts Williams, is that being able to understand what a 
given thing is involves having an understanding of its determinables.  In other words, 
if we cannot know something’s attributes, then we are groundlessly making assertions 
when we posit any claims about such things.  Without knowledge of the 
determinables, all we are left with is conjecture.  Yet, adding further difficulty to the 
issue, Williams argues we are forced to accept that a person is a sort of thing that 
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necessarily displays determinates at some time (when embodied), but does not 
necessarily do so at all times (when disembodied). 
 If the weight of an immaterial substance is indiscernible from that of its body, 
then we really know nothing except what we observe of the body.  It may be argued, 
however that this is not the case.  For example, it might be argued that the above 
claim is unreasonable, as it would be similar to asserting that the ideas of a book 
disappear when the book disappears.  Similarly, the objection might state that the 
problem of indiscernibility is really a pseudo-problem, since we can explain the 
problem much like the velocity of a bullet disappearing when the bullet stops 
moving.  Both of these objections are unsound, and fail for the same reason, namely 
that they are not plausible analogies of the original assertion.  That is, the book 
analogy fails because the ideas of the book are clearly discernible from the physical 
incarnation of the book.  We never make the confusion that the ideas in the book are a 
physical property of the book, nor that the weight of the book is something that exists 
once the book ceases to exist.  Likewise, we do not confuse the velocity of the bullet 
with one of the bullet’s other physical properties, such as the weight and length of the 
bullet.  If its velocity were a property indiscernible from the bullet itself, then we 
should be able to measure the velocity of the bullet while it is moving and at rest and 
come up with identical figures – just as we can measure the length of the bullet 
moving and at rest and come up with identical lengths. 
Williams believes the indiscernibility of the properties of immaterial 
substances from that of their bodies, as described above, demonstrates that those 
committed to the belief in disembodiment necessarily adopt the Cartesian position – 
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that bodies and immaterial substances are genuinely separate from each other.  As 
such, the weight of a person has always been zero.  If this were not so, then we should 
expect to see an increase in a body’s weight, should an immaterial substance suddenly 
occupy it. 
Quinton argues that the dispositions and character of a person can exist apart 
from any one particular body, so long as they are manifested within a body (59-60).  I 
am not exactly sure what this entails, since this is similar to making the claim that 
height and weight can exist apart from any particular body, so long as they are 
manifested within a body. 
 On the one hand, Quinton’s claim sounds very similar to Descartes’ idea that 
the self is both separate from and, at the same time, intermingled with the body.  
Unless we are going to argue that dispositions and character (along with all the other 
properties we attribute to persons) are somehow special or different than the other 
properties of bodies, then I think Quinton’s argument bears little fruit.  I think that to 
say properties are not identical with a body and to say that properties can exist apart 
from a body are not logically identical concepts, nor does one follow logically from 
the other.  Williams implies this as well, when he states that persons should be 
classified as material bodies that think, rather than a mind that has a body (Problems 
of the Self 70), and, furthermore, that persons and bodies are not identical, but that 
this does not entail they are two different things (Problems of the Self 73-74).  So, 
then, if we intend to argue that the properties of persons are different than the 
properties of other bodies, in a way that allows them to become genuinely 
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disembodied from any sort of body, then it is necessary to explain how these 
properties differ in such a way.  Quinton does not offer any explanation to this extent. 
 Ayer argues against the idea of immaterial substances, although for different 
reasons than Williams does above.  That is, Ayer claims that, “The problems with 
which philosophers have vexed themselves in the past, concerning the possibility of 
bridging the gulf between mind and matter in knowledge or in action, are all fictitious 
problems arising out of the senseless metaphysical conception of mind and matter, or 
minds and material things, as substances.” (124).  Likewise, he states, “But, when one 
comes to enquire into the nature of this substance, one finds that it is an entirely 
unobservable entity.”(Ayer, 126)  For Ayer, then, we understand that immaterial 
substances are not a criterion for determining personal identity.  What is important to 
note is that his objection does not rest simply on a denial of the existence of 
immaterial substances.  Rather, what we find is that Ayer protests because he thinks 
propositions about immaterial substances are inherently unknowable and are, 
therefore, purely conjecture.  This is evident when he claims that, “we shall maintain 
that no statement which refers to a ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all possible 
sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must 
follow that the labours of those who have striven to describe such a reality have all 
been devoted to the production of nonsense.”(Ayer, 34).  As we shall see, Perry 
echoes this idea when he claims that if we cannot observe the soul, then we have no 
way of knowing whether or not we are the same soul from day to day. 
 All of these considerations emphasize the difficulty of clearly defining and 
describing immaterial substances and/or the soul.  Even if we concede Quinton’s 
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ghost example, it is clear that we have done so without conclusive observational 
evidence.  That is, we draw our beliefs about the soul without any direct observation 
of immaterial substances.  Accordingly, the problem becomes one of attempting to 
describe things that are beyond the scope of observation and experience.  What we 
appear to be left with are abstract ideas or, perhaps, what we can call content.  By 
content, I simply mean what is sometimes referred to as the special relations of 
memory, character, habits, beliefs, intentions, and preferences that constitute a 
personality.  The notion is that so long as this content exists, then so does the person.  
For example, if we take all of the content that makes Michael Ellis the person he is, 
and successfully transplant it into another body, then, allegedly, Michael Ellis is 
preserved in this new body.  His content, we might say, is not dependent upon any 
particular body.  Yet, as we saw in the previous chapter, Williams points out that 
transplanted identities of this sort give rise to the problem of duplication, which 
contradicts the concept of identity, because identity in the strict sense is a one-one 
relation. 
 What we must consider is whether or not the introduction of immaterial 
substances, into the above concept, makes the theory any more plausible.  For 
instance, if we grant the plausibility of transplanting persons from body to body, are 
we claiming that person contents are being transported by means of immaterial 
substances?  Or, rather, are we claiming that transplanting is simply a physical 
process, more closely analogous to copying information from one computer to 
another?  If we mirror a computer’s hard drive onto another one, then we duplicate 
the contents, so that the information on each is exactly similar.  The computer 
 77 
analogy is useful because it demonstrates a simple transfer of information from one 
physical body to another, which no one (apart from, perhaps, a few misguided Star 
Trek fans) believes was done through any means of immaterial substances.  The 
information on the new hard drive merely resembles (exactly) the information found 
on the original computer. 
 What may be objectionable here, however, is that computers and human 
beings are too different to make a useful analogy.  Computers are neither conscious, 
nor self-conscious things, unlike human beings.  This objection harkens back to 
Quinton’s observation that the soul has been used to explain the difference between 
living and non-living things.  If, then, we are arguing that it is the soul that transfers 
person content from one body to another, then we must be able to answer specific 
questions to support our claim.  For example, what means will we use to demonstrate 
that the soul transfers person content from body to body?  If we determine that this 
process is beyond demonstration, then how are we to verify our claim?  Will 
introspection reveal the nature of the soul, as some, including Descartes, have 
argued? 
 Both Ayer and Dennett argue against the reliability of introspection.  Ayer 
states that a substantive ego, of the Cartesian sort, is not revealed through self-
consciousness, and if it is not revealed there, then it is not revealed anywhere (126).  
He concludes that the existence of such entities is completely unverifiable.  Similarly, 
Dennett argues that we are fooling ourselves with our belief that introspection is 
either infallible or incorrigible; furthermore, we are wrong to believe that 
introspection is merely “looking and seeing,” when what we are really doing is 
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theorizing (Consciousness Explained 67).  Questions of the kind we are addressing 
here are what bring us to examine the next of our primary questions regarding 
personal identity based upon the criterion of immaterial substances. 
 2) Are persons and souls identical?  When we pose this question, what we are 
speculating is whether or not a person is simply identical to a soul, or if persons are 
things that have souls.  If a person simply is a soul, then, by the transitivity of 
identity, anything we find true about one is also true of the other.  If, however, 
persons are things that have souls, then there must be some way to distinguish one 
from the other.  For the purpose of our examination, let us adopt the Cartesian 
concept of the soul.  Assuming persons and souls are identical we will see how this 
impacts our theory of personal identity.  To begin, the most serious criticism is that if 
we cannot find a way to determine the identity of a soul, then, necessarily, we cannot 
determine personal identity.  When Michael Ellis claims that he is the same person he 
was ten years ago, according to this position, he is making no reference to his 
physical body.  His statement is true no matter what body his soul presently occupies, 
since the soul and the person are the same thing.  Yet, we might argue that not all 
references to persons exclude a reference to bodies. 
 In some instances, we use language in ways that refer to persons specifically 
by means of their physical bodies.  For example, if I say, “He only has twenty dollars 
on his person,” I am not claiming that he has twenty dollars on his soul.  There are 
several conclusions we may draw from this example.  We could claim that, in some 
cases at the very least, when we refer to persons we are referring to physical bodies; 
or we could claim that this is simply an example of misused language, since persons 
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are not equal to bodies.  Does including the soul into our theory of personal identity 
enrich our understanding of the concept of personal identity? 
 Arguably, the apparent benefit we gain from equating persons and souls is that 
we are given a definitive way to establish personal identity, when there are 
questionable instances of bodily identity (such as a body swap or reincarnation).  If 
two men both claim to be reincarnations of Thomas Jefferson, then relying on the 
soul, we might say, will allow us to determine the truth of each man’s personal 
identity.  It may turn out that neither man is a reincarnation of Thomas Jefferson; yet, 
if one is in fact a genuine reincarnation, then he will turn out to be the same soul that 
inhabited the body of Thomas Jefferson in a previous state.  But how can we really 
make such determinations when the very thing this position rests upon (i.e., the soul) 
is beyond all means of perception?  Furthermore, the problem we face here, regarding 
the unobservable nature of the soul, is applicable whether or not we equate persons 
and souls – so long as the soul remains an aspect of our explanation of personal 
identity.  That is, the fact that the soul is unobservable causes problems if we claim 
that persons and souls are identical or, likewise, if we claim that persons have souls.  
We cannot determine if persons and souls are identical, nor can we establish a means 
to distinguish the two from each other. 
 We can, however, speculate what it would mean were we able to determine 
persons are things that have souls, based on some of the fundamental ideas of 
identity.  If persons are things that have souls, then the two are not identical.3  If our 
theory also maintains that persons are not identical to bodies, then we conclude that 
persons are neither souls, nor bodies.  In this case, persons appear to be something 
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other than material and immaterial substances.  What other options are left open to 
us?  We are left with arguing that personal identity consists in a special relationship 
(such as person content or memory), that there is no such thing as personal identity, 
or that a person’s identity consists in some, as of yet, undetermined criterion.  Let us 
now turn our focus away from attempting to define immaterial substance, in order to 
examine the viability of a theory based on such substances. 
 3) Is it possible to establish personal identity based on the criterion of an 
immaterial substance?  In asking this question, we attempt to understand the 
circumstances, if any, under which we can tell whether or not a person is the same 
from moment to moment, based entirely upon the reliance of immaterial substance.  
The first difficulty to consider, which we have already briefly examined, regards the 
problem of determining genuine identity from cases of exact similitude. 
 Placing immaterial substances at the base of our argument poses this problem: 
How are we to determine personal identity if we cannot, in any practical or 
conceivable way, observe immaterial substances?  In fact, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, Williams argues that the bodily criterion is the only way to distinguish 
identity from exact similitude.  This may seem a strong claim, but if we recall what 
we learned of Williams’ position about cases of duplication, we remember that he 
claimed that such instances are counterintuitive to the concept of identity.  Identity, 
he states, is only a one-one relation, never a one-many or many-many relation 
(Problems of the Self 15).  Since duplication creates a one-many relation, we no 
longer have a case of genuine identity. 
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 By employing the bodily criterion, we can resolve certain issues regarding 
personal identity that we could not have by relying on immaterial substances.  For 
instance, if we examine bodily criterion in cases of duplication, we have a means of 
determining which person existed prior to the duplication and which is the duplicate 
person.  Person A’s body at time T1 has a spatio-temporal continuity different from 
Person B’s body at the same time.  Yet, after the duplication of A to B, at time T2 
both will claim to be Person A – each having all the appropriate memories and beliefs 
of Person A.  Indeed, to this point, Williams states, “The only case in which identity 
and exact similarity could be distinguished, as we have just seen, is that of the 
body….”(Problems of the Self 10) 
 Both Perry and Quinton further this idea to some extent, each in their own 
way claiming that immaterial substances cannot be a criterion of determining one’s 
personal identity.  Perry claims that, “If identity consisted in knowledge of the soul, 
then all of our beliefs about personal identity would be groundless and mysterious.”4  
He draws this conclusion based on the premise that, if we cannot observe the soul, 
then we cannot observe it to be the same (Dialogue 17).  Quinton’s approach states 
that if the soul is a permanent and unfaltering part of our consciousness, then, being 
unobservable, it must be useless for purposes of identification (54).  This is, in fact, 
why he believes Hume failed in his efforts to observe the single impression of the 
self.  That is to say, Quinton argues that we can only observe that which changes; the 
fact that the soul is a constant, unchanging aspect of our existence is what makes it 
unobservable.  For without variation we have no frame of reference.  Accordingly, 
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Hume’s mistake was to deny the existence of the self, when the very fact that an ever-
present impression lends us no way to observe it (Quinton, 55). 
 So, again, we are brought back to the difficulty of verifying claims about an 
unobservable immaterial substance.  This leads us to conclude that either personal 
identity is unverifiable (if we maintain that it rests upon immaterial substance) or that 
bodily identity is at least a criterion of determining personal identity.  If we can 
demonstrate that the latter is false, then perhaps we must admit that there is no such 
thing as personal identity. 
Bodies, Consciousness and Reduction 
 Considering the difficulties of establishing personal identity based on 
immaterial substances, it seems only fitting to bring the same level of scrutiny into 
our examination of the bodily criterion.  In doing so, we draw ourselves closer to an 
understanding of what is necessary for establishing a definitive theory of personal 
identity, or to the realization that there is really no such thing as personal identity, in 
the strict, philosophical sense of the term.  Can we establish personal identity based 
on bodily criterion?  It would seem that Williams sufficiently answered this question 
when he demonstrated that the use of bodily identity allows us to distinguish between 
identity and exact similitude.  All we need to know to determine personal identity, we 
might say, are the facts regarding one’s body at a given time.  What this implies is 
that persons and bodies are identical.  Yet, as Williams explains, it is objectionable 
that persons simply are bodies, although he is doubtful that this premise is 
demonstrable (Problems of the Self 74).  The objection to persons being identical to 
bodies asserts that notions such as, “Michael Ellis” and “Michael Ellis’ body” are not 
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logically the same.  Williams thinks, as do I, that examples such as this do not entail 
the necessity of immaterial substances; rather, they are examples that reflect concerns 
about the ways we talk about persons and bodies.  Hence, he states that, “it is 
certainly not exactly the same thing to love a person and to love his or her body.  But 
this does not show…that persons and bodies are two different things.”(Problems of 
the Self 74). 
 The thesis of the bodily criterion is that bodies (and not immaterial 
substances) are the subjects of psychological attributes.  This view is described as 
reductive, since it explains psychological states by reducing them to material states of 
the brain.  Williams argues that the concerns regarding language do not threaten this 
assertion.  For example, in stating, “Gus Shultz loves his dog, Bingo,” rather than, 
“Gus Shultz’s body loves his dog, Bingo,” we have not conclusively demonstrated 
that persons are anything other than bodies.  Instead, what we have shown is only that 
our conventions of speaking are such that we find it awkward to phrase expressions in 
the latter sense.  To this extent, I agree with Williams, although, as Quinton attests, 
even if we grant that immaterial substances do not exist, this does not exclude the 
possibility of a “unitary nonbodily aspect of a person.”(57).  However, if we remove 
the possibility of immaterial substances, what might it mean to say that persons are a 
unitary nonbodily aspect of bodies? 
 A typical response to questions regarding a unitary nonbodily aspect of 
persons concerns matters of experience.  That is, the point might be made that the 
single subject of experience is what constitutes the unifying nonbodily aspect of 
persons.  The person at time T1 is the same person at time T2, because of the shared 
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subject of experience.  We might also refer to this as the same unity of consciousness.  
As such, we say that the same consciousness that experienced the events of my fifth 
birthday party is the same consciousness that experiences these words, as I sit here 
writing them.  I am that thing that shares both experiences – the same subject of 
experience. 
 What concerns us here is determining whether or not we are justified in 
believing in a single subject of experience.  Are we justified in believing that our 
consciousness unifies our experiences?  Let us refer to this unified consciousness as 
our self.  Is there a single, permanent self that is present throughout each of our 
experiences, or are we merely something akin to Hume’s bundle of impressions?  
From a phenomenal perspective, the answer seems blatantly obvious – we are unified, 
cohesive selves that experience and perceive collectively, not as a disjointed bundle 
of impressions that present the illusion of unity.  Our main reason for accepting this 
notion is our own first-person perspective, through which we understand our 
separation from the experiences of others.  Thomas Nagel emphatically rejects the 
idea of the unity of consciousness, as does Dennett.  For instance, Dennett states, 
“There is no single point in the brain where all information funnels in, and this fact 
has some far from obvious – indeed, quite counterintuitive – consequences.” 
(Consciousness Explained 102-03).  Nagel’s beliefs are equally critical in examining 
the unity of consciousness, although he is not as optimistic as Dennett about a 
resolution to the problem.  In fact, Nagel claims that it may be “impossible for us to 
abandon certain ways of conceiving and representing ourselves, no matter how little 
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support they get from scientific research.  This, I suspect, is true of the idea of the 
unity of a person….”5 
 The evidence used to support Nagel’s argument comes from cases of split-
brain patients.  In these cases, he states that subjects display behavior that indicates 
the existence of at least two streams of consciousness.  However, it is arguable that in 
these split-brain cases both streams are not genuinely conscious, since the right 
hemisphere’s responses often appear like that of an automaton, rather than conscious 
mental processes.  Nagel rejects this description of the split-brain phenomena; he 
believes the actions are “too elaborate, too intentionally directed and too 
psychologically intelligible to be regarded merely as a collection of unconscious 
automatic responses.”(Personal Identity 235). 
 Some of our investigations into the unity of consciousness begin from rather 
suppositional premises.  For example, if we being by asking “Can the self divide?” or 
“Can consciousness split?” then we start from a biased attitude.  Both of these 
questions presuppose unity from the outset.  What we should ask, rather, is whether 
or not consciousness is unified and, furthermore, how do we go about determining 
such questions. 
 Someone championing the unity of consciousness might respond to Nagel by 
claiming that, even if there are separate streams of consciousness, these streams are 
part of the same subject of experience, and are, therefore, ultimately unified.  But in 
order to concede this point it seems we must accept a Cartesian view of the subject of 
experience.  That is to say, our conception of a unified subject of experience becomes 
one of a separately existing thing, if we insist that our consciousness is disjointed on 
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one level, yet ultimately unified on another.  The only way I can conceive of avoiding 
a move towards a separately existing subject is if we were claiming that, while 
aspects of our consciousness are disjointed, being a part of the same life nonetheless 
unifies it.  I would hardly say, however, that this is sufficient to demonstrate a single 
subject of experience, since I can easily imagine the possibility of a disjointed 
consciousness that is part of a shared life, which involves no single subject of 
experience.  This is, in fact, precisely the kind of idea Hume’s bundle theory employs 
– a series of overlapping sensations, belonging to the same continued life, without a 
single subject of experience or self.  In other words, “same continued life” by no 
means entails the need for a single subject of experience. 
 I agree with Nagel in that I believe our reasons for rejecting the idea of 
disjointed persons is a result of the habitual ways in which we conceive of ourselves, 
which is a direct result of our phenomenological experience.  I see no absurdity, 
however, in the concept of disjointed persons, nor any necessity in the truth of a 
single subject of experience.  One of the reasons to reject a disjointed view of persons 
is the belief that consciousness is all-or-nothing.  Dennett argues that consciousness is 
a phenomenon of degrees, not something that separates the universe into two 
categories – conscious and unconscious (Consciousness Explained 447).  He believes 
that our false assumption about this all-or-nothing view of consciousness is a result of 
essentialism – the belief that there must be sharp, definite dividing lines for the 
explanation or natures of things.  We believe that every question has a definite answer 
(Consciousness Explained 420-21).  I think we can categorize this kind of belief as a 
type of logical determinism, in that it uses the same type of either/or logic we find in 
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cases involving logical determinism.  For example, an adoption of the all-or-nothing 
view of persons allows us to argue that either persons are conscious or they are not, 
or, similarly, that something is either a person or it is not. 
 At first glance, statements of this kind seem to carry a bit of force.  However, 
if we take a closer look, we find they are not as telling as they appear to be.  As Roy 
Weatherford states, “Logical determinism is, we conclude, like so many philosophical 
doctrines, either true but trivial or significant but false, depending on how it is 
construed.”6  What this entails is that, if true, we essentially gain nothing from 
statements of this sort.  Conceding these kinds of deterministic statements has trivial 
results, since they are epistemologically vacuous.  For example, let us suppose we are 
posed with the claim, “A person either has a soul or he does not.”  While this may 
very well be true, it is a trivial claim in that it brings us no closer to the truth of 
knowing whether or not persons have souls.  We have gained no knowledge about the 
real world from the assertion.  Not only is this the case, but we are also presented 
with false alternatives, since there is no absurdity in claiming that personhood is a 
matter of degrees or that questions about our identity do not necessarily carry 
definitive answers.  Parfit states that, “Only if we are separately existing entities can it 
be true that our identity must be determinate.” (Reasons and Persons 216). 
 We see that the all-or-nothing view brings us back again to a kind of Cartesian 
approach to personal identity.  In order to work around this kind of thinking, Dennett 
argues that we must neutralize the illusion of what he calls the Central Meaner – the 
idea of a single subject of experience, or Boss, which is in charge of running the 
system (Consciousness Explained 228).  This concept is not unlike the reductionism 
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we examined previously in Searle’s arguments.  Searle discussed the reduction of the 
mind to physical, micro-level functions of the brain.  Likewise, Dennett argues, “As 
usual, the way to discharge an intelligence that is too big for our theory is to replace it 
with an ultimately mechanical fabric of semi-independent semi-intelligences acting in 
concert.”(Consciousness Explained 257).  While someone supporting the Cartesian 
dualist position would reject such a notion, we can certainly see similar types of 
phenomena when we examine the way computers function.  That is, binary 
informational systems provide a fantastic example of how simple micro-level states 
can produce various and often unexpectedly remarkable results.  In binary, we begin 
with a system that works on the combinations of on/off states – and this is the whole 
of the system’s logic.  By merely combining various states of on/off logic, we are 
able to produce colors, sounds, images and video, communicate with others at nearly 
any given point on the planet, and much more.  Arguably, none of this demonstrates 
that computers act intelligently.  However, what is important to consider is that 
computers can yield all of these results, as well as execute powerful computations 
faster and more accurately than even the brightest human beings, yet no one ever 
argues that there must be some immaterial substance or unified consciousness inside 
controlling the system. 
Another point that one might argue against this analogy is that computers do, 
in fact, have a sort of mechanical Central Meaner, since all of the information is 
processed by the Central Processing Unit (CPU).  Yet, this is a bit of a mistake.  
While most of a computer’s workload is processed by the CPU, many types of 
computer hardware contain instructions that allow it to bypass the CPU altogether to 
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access memory – a process called Direct Memory Access (DMA).  Furthermore, 
computer networks can be setup to process information in tandem, so that many 
processors work on smaller parts of the information, and processing is decentralized. 
 So, what does all of this have to do with personal identity?  It is meant to 
demonstrate the kinds of phenomena that are possible purely as a result of simple 
micro-level processes, like those described by Searle and Dennett.  We are not 
implying that the analogy refutes the possibility of the existence of immaterial 
substances or single subjects of experience.  Rather, what we intend to demonstrate 
from the analogy is that, if we can generate such remarkable phenomena and results 
by mechanical micro-level information systems, then this at least lends the possibility 
that the same is true for biological micro-level processes.  Apart from having a 
personal bias or reluctance to such a notion, we can just as easily conceive of 
ourselves having personal identity without relying on immaterial substances or single 
subjects of experience.  This reluctance does not negate the plausibility of the 
alternative explanation regarding capacities of micro-level biological systems 
producing remarkable macro-level results.  As Dennett notes, there is a difference 
between finding something hard to believe and being reluctant to believe something is 
possible (Consciousness Explained 432-33).  I believe, as Nagel implied, that our 
reluctance to accept such a view of ourselves says more about the nature of our 
conceptual limitations than it does about the logical shortcomings of the theory. 
 While Dennett and Searle agree that it is possible to describe mental 
phenomena in terms of reductionism (i.e. without regard to immaterial substances or 
single subjects of experience), they diverge about their views of consciousness.  For 
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example, Dennett’s argument champions the idea that consciousness is not some sort 
of special phenomenon limited to living things, but is defined, rather, in more 
behaviorist terms.  As such, he claims that, “a suitably ‘programmed’ robot, with a 
silicon-based computer brain, would be conscious, would have a self.”(Consciousness 
Explained 430).  Ayer concurs with Dennett, and concludes his own argument by 
asserting, “For when I assert an object is conscious I am asserting no more than that it 
would, in response to any conceivable test, exhibit the empirical manifestations of 
consciousness.”(130). 
 Searle emphatically denies any such notion that machines are able (or ever 
will be able) to produce genuine consciousness or minds.  The difference between, 
say, robots and human beings is that even robots performing seemingly intelligent 
acts cannot understand the meaning behind their actions, he argues (Searle, 35).  He 
believes the problem is a difference between duplication and simulation.  That is, 
computers and machines can simulate the kinds of mental phenomena of human 
beings, but they can never duplicate it, since “no simulation by itself constitutes 
duplication.”(Searle, 37). 
Searle’s argument poses one of the greatest difficulties regarding reductionism 
and our descriptions of mental phenomena.  Suppose a life-long friend claimed that 
robots are capable of genuine consciousness, thought, intentions, and all of the other 
phenomena typically associated with human beings and living things.  Upon hearing 
this claim, suppose that we argued, like Searle, that the idea was absurd since 
machines can only simulate such phenomena.  After our rejection of the claim, our 
friend opens his head to reveal that he has a highly sophisticated computer brain.  He 
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is, and always has been, a robot.  There seem to be two positions we can adopt about 
this revelation: 1) We can claim that we were obviously wrong, since our friend is a 
robot with consciousness and all other properties associated with the mental life of 
human beings or 2) we can claim that we are correct in believing that robots cannot 
duplicate consciousness, and we have merely been tricked into believing that our 
friend was conscious all these years. 
How are we to decide which description is correct?  Remember that Searle’s 
argument states that computers can never duplicate genuine consciousness.  
Therefore, if we adopt his position, then our response will resemble the second 
remark above.  Yet, Dennett and Ayer would claim that the first description is true, 
since all we need to do is examine the behavior of the friend to determine whether or 
not he is genuinely conscious. 
The kind of reductive dilemma we are faced with here is one that Williams 
addresses as well.  Considering such cases, one question we must answer, he states, 
is: What are material properties?  He argues that, “If they are just whatever properties 
material bodies have, then it painlessly follows from the thesis that psychological 
properties are included among material ones.  If it is just defined to exclude 
psychological predicates, it patently begs the question.”(Problems of the Self 74).  
What Williams’ insight shows us is that a definitional rejection of the idea that 
machines are capable of genuine mental activity excludes machines from the class of 
conscious things by default.  That is, Searle believes it is a definitional truth that 
computers cannot be conscious, since computer programs operate only syntactically, 
and minds are more than syntactical (31).  Based on Searle’s description, however, 
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we can also make the claim that much of the animal kingdom is not genuinely 
conscious.  Conceivably, animals can react to and interact with their environment 
instinctually – without any real understanding of the meaning behind their actions. 
The only exception that Searle takes with his position regards machines that 
would actually function like human beings.  Thus, he states, “If you could build a 
machine that had the same structure as a human being, then presumably that machine 
would be able to think.  Indeed, it would be a surrogate human being.”(Searle, 35-36).  
Furthermore, he argues that modern computers and similar calculating devices do not 
go through the same process as a human brain, even if all of the steps are formally the 
same, simply because such machines have no mental phenomena (Searle, 48).  So, we 
see that Searle believes that even with identical formal processes, it is conceivably 
possible that there is still something inherently different about the ways in which 
machines and brains operate, based on the absence or presence of mental phenomena. 
Searle’s attitude toward machine consciousness is not uncommon.  It is a 
popular belief that machines simply cannot have the kinds of experiences that living 
organisms experience.  This attitude is sometimes described as having a bias towards 
wetware, i.e. organic matter, as opposed to hardware, when dealing with the 
authenticity of consciousness and mental states.  Disregarding examples such as 
robots, thinking computers, and the like, are there any existing technologies that may 
serve to revise our hardware prejudices? 
One example of a possible shift between man and machine, which never fails 
to fascinate me, is the development of sensitive prosthetics.  Artificial limbs that can 
register sensations of temperature and pressure lend evidence to the claim that 
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wetware may not carry the special privileged position we generally assume.  If 
plastics and wires can achieve the same result as the organics of muscles, flesh, and 
nerve endings, then perhaps we are wrong to so strongly assert our biases about 
wetware. 
While prosthetics of this sort are remarkable, clearly they are not sophisticated 
enough to produce consciousness.  It is quite obvious that we can argue that the 
success of such prosthetics should not surprise us, because the brain moderates them, 
which is organic.  What would we say if we were able to replace the entire body, save 
for an organic brain?  Is an artificial human body, controlled by an organic brain, 
conscious?  What about the inverse – an organic body controlled by a synthetic brain?  
According to Searle’s argument, the first description clearly constitutes conscious, 
because an organic brain controls the artificial body; the second description would 
produce consciousness so long as the synthetic brain generates genuine mental 
phenomena. 
Further complicating the reduction of consciousness to physical states or 
processes, Nagel argues that any such reductive theory must also account for the 
phenomenological features of experience.7  In other words, a genuine reductive 
account of consciousness must be able to explain our subjective experiences, not 
merely the mental processes required to produce consciousness.  This would require 
providing an objective account of experiences, which Nagel claims is impossible.  We 
cannot give an objective account of experience, he states, since “any shift to greater 
objectivity…does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us 
farther away from it.”(Mortal Questions 174). 
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Dennett disagrees with Nagel’s assessment of the problem of providing a 
theory of consciousness.  Dennett claims that what is necessary is that we concern 
ourselves with what we can know about a creature’s consciousness, not whether or 
not we can turn our minds into the minds of these creatures on a phenomenal level 
(Consciousness Explained 442).  The structure of an animal’s consciousness, he 
states, is just as accessible as the structure of its digestive system (Consciousness 
Explained 447).  The analogy of the digestive system to the stomach is the same 
concept we saw Searle assert in his attempt to dissolve the mind-body problem. 
By Nagel’s reckoning, for something to be conscious there is something it is 
like to be that thing (Mortal Questions 166).  I believe this is similar to what Searle 
means by his rejection of thinking computers, namely that there are no mental 
phenomena and therefore it follows that there is no meaning to talk about what it is 
like to be a computer.  And it is this phenomenal sense of being in other creatures that 
Nagel argues is beyond our intellectual grasp.  A consequence of Nagel’s argument, 
however, is that we are therefore locked out of an understanding of the minds of other 
human beings as well.  Nagel recognizes this problem.  His response is that the more 
similar we are to another creature, the more likely we are able to adopt its point of 
view or the quality of its experiences (Mortal Questions 172).  So, for example, it is 
easier for us to understand what it would be like to be Michael Ellis than it is for us to 
understand what it is like to be an earthworm, since we are more similar in kind to 
Michael Ellis.  Nevertheless, it is the inaccessibility of the subjective experience of 
others that Nagel claims disallows any reductive theory of consciousness. 
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Clearly, this problem regarding the reduction of consciousness (and, for that 
matter, all mental states) to physical states of the brain is a difficult one.  On the one 
hand, Dennett’s and Ayer’s approach seems like a bit of an over-simplification for 
something as complex as consciousness – especially when we consider Searle’s 
remarks about thinking machines and computers.  On the other hand, Nagel’s 
argument appears so stringent that we can never truly be certain about anything’s 
consciousness, or subjective experiences, other than our own. 
What is important for us to ask at this point is whether or not we can establish 
personal identity using the bodily criterion, even if we cannot conclusively show that 
consciousness and mental phenomena reduce to brain states.  Or, rather, is any such 
theory shattered without this verification?  At the beginning of this chapter, we noted 
that one of the primary considerations in favor of the bodily criterion is that personal 
identity appears to go where the brain goes.  Can we then build a theory around this 
fact, regardless of what is said about the reducibility of consciousness to physical 
brain states?  Let us now examine the validity of the claim that personal identity 
follows the brain. 
Since the brain is so closely related to all of the standard mental phenomena 
we associate with personal identity (e.g., character, intention, memory, etc.), perhaps 
it is best that we phrase our question as follows: Under what circumstances would we 
say that personal identity does not follow the brain?  If we disallow the possibility of 
immaterial substances, it is difficult to imagine a case where these mental phenomena 
would not follow the brain in a brain swapping experiment.  For example, if we 
swapped the brains of Person A and Person B, we would be quite surprised, after the 
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fact, to find Person A’s body still owning the habits, character, intentions, and 
memories associated with the brain now inside Person B’s head.  However, this does 
not necessitate that persons are merely bodies, but instead shows only that personal 
identity appears to follow the brain.  We can just as easily imagine that persons are 
merely a relationship of contents, as described earlier, and that this relationship 
follows the brain, but would hold when attached to any brain, not simply the brain of 
a specific individual.  As such, this entails that persons would essentially be a set of 
information. 
The problem with describing persons solely as content or information, as 
Williams noted, is that it gives us no way to determine genuine identity from exact 
similitude.  Additionally, it allows for the possibility of duplication, which is contrary 
to the idea of identity.  If every instance of a brain swap produced results where the 
person’s mental phenomena (i.e., his psychology) followed the brain, then we have at 
the very least some minimal reason for supposing that personal identity is in some 
way associated with the brain.  Arguably, we could say that brains are types of 
bodies, and since personal identity follows the brain, it follows that personal identity 
relies on the bodily criterion.  This amounts to nothing more than saying – same 
person equals same brain.  And this notion appears to hold true even if consciousness 
and any other mental phenomena are found to be irreducible to physical states of the 
brain.  That is, if mental states are some sort of metaphysical phenomena, we can still 
claim that personal identity follows the brain, so long as these irreducible mental 
states follow the brain.  Michael Ellis would still be the same person, it seems, if his 
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brain were swapped, regardless of whether or not we discovered that mental 
phenomena reduce to physical states of the brain. 
Under normal circumstances, then, it appears we have a strong argument for 
believing that personal identity follows the brain.  This of course is true only if we 
maintain the implausibility of theories based upon immaterial substances.  When we 
begin to consider the previously mentioned problem cases (i.e., duplication and 
replication), however, our claims about personal identity become less certain.  And 
our theory must consider such problem cases, if we are to develop a working concept 
of personal identity.  It is to these abstract considerations that we turn our attention to 
in the next chapter.  In doing so, I believe we will uncover a pivotal understanding of 
why these theories have failed to provide the kind of conclusive or definitive account 
of personal identity that we seek.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE MEANING OF IT ALL 
 
Drawing Conclusions 
 Having examined the primary theories and concepts related to the 
philosophical discourse about personal identity, it is now time to see what we can 
discover about our inquiry.  Why is it that all of the theories generated difficulties, 
disallowing the sort of definitive resolution that would put the issue to rest?  Is there, 
perhaps, some inherent commonality, which explains the lack of conclusive, ironclad 
certainty we strive to establish in our definitive theory of personal identity?  This is 
our task in this chapter – to examine the nature of these theories themselves. 
Specifically, our analysis throughout this chapter will consider the various 
ways language influences our ideas about personal identity.  We will also examine 
meaning, contingency, and arbitrary decision, as they apply to the development of a 
definitive theory of personal identity.  In doing so, we will not pose our own theory of 
personal identity, but will instead produce a meta-theory of personal identity.  In 
short, we are creating a theory about theories of personal identity. 
Contingency and Arbitrary Decision 
The very beginning of our examination of personal identity concerned 
Descartes’ notion of mind-body separation, and the problems associated with material 
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and immaterial substances as they related to personal identity.  We will now revisit 
Descartes to discuss a single concept he mentions yet never fully develops – one 
which I believe is pivotal for understanding the difficulties about theories of personal 
identity from his day through our contemporary discussions.  In Descartes, we find a 
sort of admission about a difficulty that exists regarding conceptualizations of a 
definitive theory of personal identity.  That is, in the Meditations, Descartes 
recognizes that his beliefs about those other than himself are judgments of which he 
could very well be mistaken (21). 
 While Descartes was not concerned with judgment as it applies to personal 
identity, I draw attention to his statement because it explains a great deal, I think, 
about a kind of ambiguity or arbitrary nature that is admitted to some degree by many 
of the major contemporary contributors to discussions about personal identity.  A 
similar notion of judgment is also present in Hume’s treatment of personal identity.  
As we recall, Hume claimed that the problems typically associated with personal 
identity are not genuine philosophical problems; rather, they are grammatical 
difficulties (262).  And for these difficulties, he states, we have no just standard for 
deciding upon the relations attributable to identity.  As we shall see, similar 
sentiments are prominent in contemporary thought, and there is no shying away from 
admitting that our decisions regarding personal identity are made arbitrarily.  Parfit 
describes questions that generate arbitrary responses as empty questions – those 
whose answers are neither true nor false (Reasons and Persons 213).  Accordingly, he 
believes that some questions about identity simply have no real solution. 
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 If we examine a situation involving the duplication of a person’s content from 
one brain to another (in which the original person does not survive), then we are left 
asking: Is this duplicate (now the sole survivor) the same person as the original?  
Similarly, if we revisit our example of the life-long friend found to be a robot, we ask: 
Is he genuinely conscious or only simulating consciousness?  It is these sorts of 
questions that Parfit believes are empty questions.  However, being empty questions 
by no means implies that they are meaningless.  Rather, what this implies, as Parfit 
states, is that, “There is no question of either of these decisions being a mistake.” (The 
Philosophy of Mind 160).  The implication, then, is that the answer to these questions 
is not a matter of fact, but is instead expressing matters of contingency. 
 Stating that assertions about personal identity are contingent means that they 
do not follow from certain premises by logical necessity.  There is no absurdity or 
self-contradiction in adopting one framework of personal identity as opposed to 
another.  The propositions that form our account of personal identity could have been 
otherwise, if we had adopted a different conception of personhood upon which to 
formulate our framework for our theory.  What we begin to understand is that the 
failures or shortcomings of the theories of personal identity result from our initial 
approach to the problem.  That is to say, our theories of personal identity have failed 
because we approach the issues as if they are factual matters.  Our accounts of 
personal identity really express notions that are relative to frameworks of 
understanding that are not matters of fact.  This may sound difficult to accept, but I 
think more explanation will reveal why this is the case about theories of personal 
identity.  In making such a rather peculiar claim, one of the first objections will be, no 
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doubt, that statements about persons are factual statements, since such questions 
involve matters we can verify (or conceivably verify) at a particular time.  Let us start 
to clarify my claim by looking at the following question: Are statements about 
persons factual statements?  The most genuine answer we can provide is, I think, yes 
– so long as we are willing to accept that the facts are relative to a particular 
framework.  In stating as much, what I am arguing is that the facts, insomuch as they 
are facts, are relative to our concept of persons and the frameworks of understanding 
we build around this concept. 
 We must think of our statements about personal identity as relative facts – 
propositions that are either true or false based on our concept of a person, which itself 
is not a factual matter.  This is why I claim that we can certainly have a theory of 
personal identity, but never the theory of personal identity.  The truth-value of our 
propositions about personal identity hinges on our foundational assumptions about 
persons, sameness, and similar ideas.  But these assumptions are also, in a sense, the 
wild cards in our theories.  This notion of contingency with regard to our 
formulations of personal identity is implied in Dennett’s argument, when he admits 
that we have not discovered the “clearly formulatable necessary and sufficient 
conditions for ascription” and furthermore “there may be none to discover.”1  If there 
are no genuine facts to discover (i.e., no necessary conditions), then the implication is 
that any truth-value these propositions may have can only be derived from the 
statements relative to our foundational descriptions.  If we reject the foundational 
descriptions, then the basis of our theory collapses.  And we have no reason to adopt 
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one description over another, apart from our own assumptions concerning which 
description we find most practical. 
 This sort of assumptive nature to our approach of personal identity is akin to 
the kind of approach seen regarding responses to moral decisions.  For example, 
consider the question – When does life begin?  Furthermore, does an embryo have the 
same rights as a fully developed human being?  The logical tone of these questions is 
not so far removed from the logical tone of questions regarding personal identity.   
When does a baby become a person?  Am I the same person now that I was twenty 
years ago?  The assertions we make when answering such questions depend on our 
mind-sets or outlooks.  Our assumptions about the concepts of life, in the first 
example, determine what kind of assertions we are willing to accept as valid 
propositions.  The same is true about our approach to personal identity.  Our 
assumptions about personhood (and the like) lay the foundation for the kinds of 
propositions we will accept or reject about problems associated with personal 
identity. 
Regarding the beginning of life, there are those who will insist that life begins 
at the moment of conception, while others will claim that this merely constitutes the 
potential for life.  These are the sorts of examples that Parfit described in which our 
answers are neither true nor false – we cannot be mistaken in either case.  How is this 
possible?  For those who affirm that human life begins at conception, being conceived 
is equal to ensoulment, so to speak.  That is, we could argue that the soul, or self, or 
person (whatever that thing is that we are asserting exists) fully exists at the point of 
conception – it is not, we would argue, something that develops over time.  This 
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assertion of what happens at conception is simply an assumption that results from our 
foundational description.  What we must understand, however, is that our 
foundational descriptions are not logical necessities – they are not self-evident, so to 
speak.  Simply put, we do not always agree about our foundational descriptions.  
What counts as a person to some sounds entirely absurd to others, and there is no 
definitive way of reconciling this point through logic or reason.  However, we can 
examine each theory relative to its own framework.  If we understand one’s 
foundational descriptions of persons (e.g., persons are equal to bodies), then we can 
examine a theory of personal identity from that starting point.  The facts, however, 
are relative to the framework, not overarching and applicable to every theory of 
personal identity, but only to those whose foundational descriptions of persons are the 
same. 
 One of the reasons we may be so eager to reject this kind of conclusion about 
arbitrariness and instead claim that personal identity is always determinable, is 
because our phenomenological experience seems to imply that the indeterminacy of 
one’s identity is absurd.  Our first-person perspective makes us very much inclined to 
argue that there could never be a time when we could not have a definitive answer to 
questions such as, “Am I the same person I was yesterday?”  Only when we consider 
the identity of others are we less likely to insist that identity is always determinable.  
To this extent, Perry states, “This means I could conceivably be presented with facts 
that could only be interpreted as neither a clear-cut case of my own death, nor a clear-
cut case of my own survival.”2  Furthermore, he argues that, “If indeterminate cases 
become common, linguistic decisions will have to be made.”(Identities 73).  Parfit 
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likens the arbitrary cut-off point we make, when deciding what to say about personal 
identity, to that of the identity of heaps.  For example, when we have a heap of 
something (perhaps, sand), we can begin reducing the heap by its individual units.  
What Parfit argues is that there comes a point when it is not so clear-cut when we no 
longer have a heap, for it all depends on how we employ the terms (Reasons and 
Persons 233).  Claiming that there must be a sharp borderline, yet we could never 
know where it is, is more implausible than the reductive view, he states (Reasons and 
Persons 243). 
 What becomes apparent is that our definitions of persons and personhood are 
nearly as varied as those asserting the definitions.  During my own discussions with 
others, I have heard many equate persons with human beings; others claim that 
persons are equal to the sum total of our memories.  I have also heard some claim that 
we simply are persons, while others argue that persons are things we become.  It is 
arguable that only human beings qualify as persons.  Wiggins shares a prejudice 
similar in kind to this, yet not so stringent.  That is, he states that persons can never be 
an artifact (such as robots or machines), but are instead entities of a natural kind – 
though not necessarily species specific to human beings (Identities 161-62).  For 
others3, freedom of the will, along with first-order desires and second-order volitions, 
is part of the concept of persons.  We see the idea that the way we use words and 
language, and develop meaning all help determine or influence our concepts of 
persons, which, in turn, determine how we formulate our theories of personal identity.  
Therefore, if we gain an understanding of how we acquire and employ each of the 
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above, we will have some insight into how we go about formulating theories of 
personal identity and conceptualizing in general. 
 Another consideration to discuss is the notion of utility.  Part of the contingent 
aspects associated with our theories of personal identity derives from varying 
applications of utility or practicality.  For instance, it seems only fitting that when 
considering questions about personal identity, we also ask why it is important to have 
a theory of personal identity.  Why is personal identity so important?  Why does it 
matter?  The reasons for formulating our theories of personal identity are largely 
based upon the specific applicability that each theory carries.  What this means is that 
the value of a theory of personal identity is determined by its utility. 
 A theory of personal identity becomes important when we have a need to 
answer certain questions about persons – often these are questions about meaning and 
responsibility.  For example, some of the problem cases we examined (division and 
replication) draw attention to questions of responsibility.  If divisions of persons, 
replications, and brain swaps are possible considerations of personal identity, then we 
must ask how these problem cases affect matters of responsibility as it regards the 
actions and thoughts of persons involved in such cases.  If Michael Ellis’ mental 
content was duplicated into three host bodies, would each host now be responsible for 
any wrong-doings Michael Ellis may have committed?  Do persons with certain 
psychological illnesses become responsible for their actions if they have no memory 
of the acts in question?  What we find, then, is that sometimes questions about 
personal identity are questions of legal matters.  Responsibility is important for 
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personal identity because it is the concept that binds a person to the accountability of 
his or her actions. 
 Although some questions about personal identity examine aspects of 
responsibility, this is not always the case.  Some of our interest in developing a theory 
of personal identity is entirely devoid of moral issues.  For instance, when we ask 
“What am I?” or “Am I the same person that I was five years ago?” these questions 
need not address any legal or moral considerations.  We can just as easily ask these 
sorts of questions about personal identity from an approach of pure ontological 
curiosity.  Accordingly, the focus of our interest would lie on a want to understand 
concepts about existence, rather than morality. 
 As stated, our reasons for formulating a theory of personal identity are based 
upon matters of practicality or utility.  The utility of the theory is specifically 
expressed through its ability to explain differences between the individual and the 
group.  Personhood, whether questioned ontologically or morally, is a concept that 
concerns matters of individuals. 
Language and Meaning 
 The ability of language to influence our concepts of personal identity, as well 
as its ability to affect our conceptualizations in general, seems somewhat obvious.  
For, as Dennett claims, language plays a large role in constructing a human mind, and 
creatures lacking this ability should not be supposed to have similarly constructed 
minds (Consciousness Explained 447).  That language in some way influences or 
determines our concepts of personal identity is all the more obvious when we 
consider the goal of language, i.e., communication.  That is to say, our language 
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influences our concepts in that the concepts, themselves, are limited to the forms of 
expression allowed by the rules of a particular language.  In short, we can only 
conceptualize what our language allows us to express, for its rules are those by which 
our theories must play, so to speak.  As we shall see, we acquire our language 
socially, which implies that the rules will vary, slightly or drastically, from one 
language to the next. 
 Willard Van Orman Quine describes our acquisition of language as a process 
where, “Each of us learns his language by observing other people’s verbal behavior 
and having his own faltering verbal behavior observed and reinforced or corrected by 
others.”4  As such, language is a socially constructed effort of communication, and 
therein lies part of the problem we face.  Being that language is inherently social, 
there should be little surprise that we have no unanimous, definitive conclusion about 
many of our concepts, since how we use words and the ways we talk will vary to 
some degree.  What is rather puzzling, however, is the degree of confidence we 
exhibit when using some terms that appear to have ambiguous or no meaning.  For 
example, sometimes we hear people make statements such as, “That falls outside the 
scope of reality.”  When we pose the question, “What, then, is reality?” we are 
usually met with brief silence, followed by an explanation just short of ridiculousness 
– usually similar to “Anything that is real.”  I believe we meet similar issues when we 
consider statements about personal identity.  At the very simple level of casual 
conversation, we seem to know exactly what personal identity is, since we experience 
it phenomenologically – the belief that we are somehow the same from one moment 
to the next or a continuant thing.  Yet, when we are asked to produce a theory of the 
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principles upon which personal identity is based, we always appear to fall short of 
certainty.  Do we, then, genuinely understand the meaning of personal identity 
beyond the phenomenological level? 
 Quine claims that “Understanding, behaviorally viewed, is thus a statistical 
effect: it resides in multiplicities.”(59).  What this means is that our understanding of 
words comes about through a series of hit-and-miss attempts to use a word correctly.  
In some instances, we use a word and it elicits a desired result, while in others our use 
of a word results in bewilderment and correction.  Through this process, we refine our 
understandings of a word’s meaning.  A result of this process, however, is that it 
necessitates a degree of vagueness, giving no necessary sharp boundaries to the 
meanings of words, for the sake of fluency of dialogue (Quine, 59). 
 With regard to how we describe persons, any number of criteria may enter our 
formulation – or, as Shoemaker states, we may use no criteria at all (Personal Identity 
127).  However, if we do assert a set of criteria about what constitutes personal 
identity, we do so upon a conceptual formulation of persons that is ultimately a 
personal bias.  As Perry notes, “We have to choose which criterion is most important.  
It’s a matter of choice of how to use our language….”5  Yet, that such choices are 
made on personal bias does not totally destroy our efforts to understand personal 
identity.  Rather, what this entails is that we must realize that we can only examine 
personal identity by looking at the implications that derive from each relative 
formulation.  We can think of this approach to personal identity as asking, “If persons 
are X, then what can be said about their identity?”  For instance, if we accept the idea 
that persons are merely identical to bodies, then there are definitive things we can 
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infer from this starting point.  Yet, it is these starting points themselves that are 
without solid foundation.  There is not a set of rules or a logical maxim that tells us 
which of our formulations are correct and which are mistaken.  Each formulation of 
our concept about persons begins on equal ground – no one formulation supersedes 
the others by necessity. 
 How does such a fundamental confusion about our approach to the problem of 
personal identity arise?  To answer this question we will examine Gilbert Ryle’s 
views regarding our use of language and how it leads to mistakes in our ideas about 
our identity.  Ryle’s arguments are among the strongest and most deliberate assault on 
Cartesian dualism.  He refers to Cartesian dualism “with deliberate abusiveness, as 
‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’.”6  That is to say, Ryle denies the dualistic 
idea that minds and bodies are separately existing things, claiming that the dualist 
position fails because it advances on a family of logical mistakes (17).  He refers to 
these sorts of mistakes as category-mistakes – logical errors that occur when concepts 
belonging to two different logical types are inappropriately cast within the same 
logical type.  For example, if Michael Ellis states that he owns a left-footed boot and 
a right-footed boot, as well as a pair of boots, he commits a category-mistake by 
thinking that the pair of boots is some sort of third entity, rather than being a 
description of the function of both boots.  The pair is merely the collective function of 
the left and right boot. 
 How does Ryle relate the idea of the category-mistake to personal identity?  
We have already seen that Descartes believed that his mind was distinct from his 
body.  This form of dualism is based on the assumption that minds and bodies are 
 111 
diametrically opposed entities of the same logical type (Ryle, 22).  Yet, what Ryle 
argues is that this is a mistake.  He states that existence is not a generic term that 
applies equally to all concepts and that, as such, mind and body are of different 
logical types (Ryle, 23).  What this means is that when we talk about the existence of 
physical objects we are not asserting that they exist in the same sense as do things 
such as ideas, concepts, and thoughts.  However, this does not necessarily mean that 
one kind of object reduces to the other.  Although it is often accepted by the 
materialist or reductionist position that mind reduces to matter, this is not what Ryle 
argues.  The one cannot reduce to the other since it is of an entirely different logical 
type.  Once we recognize that they are of different logical types, the problem reveals 
itself as a category-mistake. 
 The type of mind that is described in Ryle’s arguments is best conceived as a 
collective function of our brain processes.  In other words, mind, as Ryle likens it, is 
simply a description of the collection of brain functions acting in tandem.  Likewise, 
neuropsychologist Paul Broks describes a system where, “Minds emerge from 
process and interaction, not substance,” and that, “The life of the self depends 
absolutely on the integrity of brain function.”7  According to Ryle, the category-
mistakes found in the dualist position arise as a result of the misapplication of index 
words – words that designate a particular reference, but are not proper things, 
themselves (188).  In particular, he argues that the ways we employ pronouns create 
mistaken notions about our identity.  Hence, he states, “Gratuitous mystification 
begins from the moment that we start to peer around for the beings named by our 
pronouns.”(Ryle, 187) 
 112 
 “What am I?”  It is this sort of formulation about questions of personal 
identity that Ryle believes is the source of the category-mistakes in Cartesian 
dualism.  I believe that the reason we treat these words differently (words such as I 
and you) is because, as mentioned in previous chapters, we are often times still 
reluctant to believe that mere matter can produce phenomena such as consciousness, 
thought, emotions, and all of the things we think separate us from inanimate objects.  
However, assuming that matter can produce such phenomena what we must ask, then, 
is whether or not the phenomena are reducible to matter. 
Do we argue a reductive theory of mental phenomena, which states that such 
phenomena are identical to mental states, or do we argue that these phenomena are 
emergent properties caused by, but not equal to, mental states?  If this question has a 
determinable answer, then I think the way we will discover it is by looking again at 
the concept of genuine identity.  If mental states are identical to consciousness, 
thought, emotions, and the like, then what we say about mental states will also be true 
of any of the given mental phenomena through the transitivity of identity.  Yet, a 
reductive theory may be insufficient for answering this question.  For example, it has 
long been part of the reductive position of materialism that all things are essentially 
reducible to matter.8  In recent years it was demonstrated that matter could be 
produced out of pure energy, which certainly discredits the strength of the materialist 
argument, simply because it makes no sense to assert that all things are reducible to 
matter, when in fact matter is reducible to energy.  We would not, however, say that 
the matter is identical with the energy that produced it.  The matter has emergent 
properties that are not inherent to the pure energy.  Likewise, reductionism may prove 
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insufficient for describing mental phenomena because they are not, strictly speaking, 
identical to the mental states that produce them. 
Ryle states that we believe there is something other than our body that we 
refer to when using ‘I’ – something in the background, which is unique to us and is 
more than the compilation of our personalia, e.g. name, age, gender (186).  What Ryle 
implies is that there is no special ghostly thing inside our head that words such as ‘I’ 
and ‘you’ name.  Rather, these words merely indicate a person to which certain 
utterances refer.  In other words, when Michael Ellis states, “I am not feeling well 
today,” his use of ‘I’ is not naming some incorporeal being inside his head, but is 
merely pointing his statement’s reference to himself.  It is an indication to anyone 
listening that his statement refers to the person uttering the statement and not to 
someone else.  Ryle observes that there is a special sense of ‘I’ because it always 
refers to the person who utters or writes a statement, whereas words such as ‘you,’ 
‘she,’ and ‘they’ can represent different references at different times (197-98). 
 Broks claims that, “People and subjects-of-experience exist as a feature of our 
language, but in no other way.”(218).  He states that our descriptions about our selves 
have developed because of our mistaken belief that we are genuinely unified beings, 
when we are actually divided and discontinuous (Broks, 41), and concludes that, “The 
self has no location, however natural it seems for us to believe otherwise.”(Broks, 
125).  These sorts of statements from Ryle and Broks are essentially the same kinds 
of criticisms we have already cited from others in the previous chapters, such as 
Hume, Dennett, Searle, and Parfit.  What Ryle’s argument adds to our discussion, 
 114 
however, is a detailed explanation of the source of these linguistic problems about 
personal identity. 
 Earlier in this chapter, I proposed the idea of relative facts, wherein we 
measure the truth-value of statements based on a frame of reference.  John Austin 
offers a similar idea pertaining to the meanings of words.  He argues that linguistic 
meaning derives essentially from sentences, rather than individual words.  For 
example, he states, “…to say that a word or a phrase ‘has a meaning’ is to say that 
there are sentences in which it occurs which ‘have meanings’: and to know the 
meaning which the word or phrase has, is to know the meanings of sentences in 
which it occurs.”9  The frame of reference for words, then, is the sentences within 
which they are used.  Accordingly, we come to understand a word’s meaning through 
our observations about how the word is used within various sentences.  This 
explanation about meaning is very much akin to what Quine argued regarding the hit-
and-miss behavioral understanding we use with language.  That is, we understand 
words through the way they are used within sentences, and the proper use of these 
words is learned through our social interaction with others.  We learn which sentences 
produce the desired responses and which ones do not.  Quine develops Austin’s point 
further, arguing that a sentence’s meaning is not fixed, but is acquired, rather, only 
within frames of reference, such as theories, paradigms, and conceptual schemes.10 
 Austin states that part of our misunderstanding about the meanings of words 
derives from our belief that all words function similarly to names, in that they 
allegedly designate something the same way that proper names do.  A second aspect 
of our misunderstanding arises from our inclination to analyze the individual words 
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within a sentence, rather than analyzing the sentence as a whole (Austin, 61).  
Austin’s idea is not unlike the point argued by Ryle when we examined the concept 
of index words.  That we use ‘I’ in a way which names something other than the 
person speaking or writing a sentence affirms Austin’s first criticism here. 
 We can see, then, that the difficulties of constructing a definitive theory of 
personal identity arise from not one, but a multitude of issues related to our use of 
language.  From the arbitrary nature of defining personhood to our misconceptions 
about the analysis of meaning, we being to realize that the failures or shortcomings of 
the traditional theories of personal identity are not, essentially, a result of faulty logic 
within the theories themselves.  I agree with Parfit’s claim that we have sufficient 
reasons to reject any of these theories.  Yet, I also think that the fundamental problem 
with the theories does not derive from their internal logical construction.  Rather, the 
problems arise from the fact that our initial approach to the subject matter is incorrect.  
We move ahead upon the false presumption that our assertions about persons are 
factually based statements, when we should understand that the foundations upon 
which our theories rest are ultimately contingent frameworks of meaning.
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